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The United States and Europe have traditionally taken very different 
approaches to the regulation of harmful conduct.  Previously, European 
nations relied almost entirely on the public enforcement of laws, whereas the 
United States relied on a mix of public and private actors.  In the United 
States, private rights of action have played a central role deterring illegal 
conduct—and, in fact, provided greater deterrence than public enforcers in 
some areas of law. They have also allowed injured parties to obtain 
compensation.  Despite their very different histories, the private enforcement 
systems in the United States and Europe are showing signs of convergence 
today. 
Since the 1970s, industry in the United States has waged a potent public 
relations campaign against private rights of action.  This pro-business 
crusade has depicted corporations as victims of a litigation explosion and 
cast plaintiffs and their attorneys as unscrupulous mercenaries.  This 
narrative has little, if any, empirical support.  Nonetheless, based on this 
mythology, the Supreme Court and other federal courts have erected a 
number of procedural obstacles to effective private enforcement of law. 
While private enforcement is in retreat in the United States, the 
European Union seeks to strengthen private rights of action, with an 
emphasis on private enforcement of antitrust law.  Recent EU initiatives 
established some of the foundations for private parties to protect their rights 
in court.  European policymakers, however, have as yet declined to establish 
effective claims’ aggregation and litigation funding mechanisms, citing the 
business victimhood mythology spread by private industry in the United 
States.  Encouragingly, a few EU Member States have rejected this paradigm 
and established some of the elements of strong private rights of action.  In 
particular, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom 
have passed laws that are likely to foster effective private litigation. 
A comparative analysis of enforcement institutions on both sides of the 
Atlantic reveals a complex picture.  American and European consumers, 
workers, and other large groups will generally face major obstacles to 
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304   UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW  Vol. 14, No. 2 
 
vindicating their rights.  In cases generating larger individual claims, 
American and European plaintiffs’ lawyers may still be able to use aggregate 
settlement procedures to hold corporate defendants to account. 
When understanding its contribution to the deterrence of harmful 
conduct, private enforcement has to be viewed together with public 
enforcement.  Because much of the enhancement of private enforcement in 
the European Union arises in the context of antitrust, it is an area ripe for 
cross-continent examination.  With antitrust, the overall enforcement 
landscapes in the United States and European Union will likely be 
drastically different in the medium term.  Due to limited public enforcement, 
a decrease in private lawsuits will severely compromise overall antitrust 
enforcement in the United States.  In Europe, strong public enforcement will 
offset generally weak private enforcement and result in far more effective 
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The United States and European nations have long taken different 
approaches to the regulation of socially harmful conduct.  Traditionally, 
Europe has relied almost exclusively on public enforcement of laws through 
robust regulatory apparatuses.  The United States, in contrast, has historically 
used a mix of public and private enforcement.  The vigorous private 
enforcement regime in the United States allowed civil society to regulate 
harmful conduct directly through lawsuits. 
Today, though, the private enforcement systems in the United States and 
Europe are showing signs of convergence.  In the United States, private 
industry has waged a relentless—and effective—political and public relations 
crusade against private enforcement.  Beginning in the 1970s, industry 
cultivated and propagated a business victimhood mythology, depicting 
corporations as victims of a litigation explosion and casting plaintiffs (and 
their attorneys) as mercenaries out to make a quick buck.  This so-called “tort 
reform” campaign has played a powerful role in reshaping the attitudes of the 
public, legislators, and judges.  As a result, the federal courts have erected 
several barriers that severely limit the scope and efficacy of private 
enforcement in the United States. 
While private enforcement has been in retreat in the United States, it has 
started to gain some traction in Europe.  The European Union’s initiatives 
have sought to strengthen private rights of action, particularly in the area of 
antitrust law.  The private enforcement project, however, has assumed a one 
step forward, half step back pace so far.  In some critical procedural areas, 
EU policymakers have unquestioningly adopted American business 
victimhood mythology and declined to establish the procedures necessary for 
effective private rights of action.  Until this mentality is shed, there will only 
be a halting rise of private enforcement in Europe, whether in the realm of 
antitrust law or more generally. 
A comparative analysis of enforcement institutions on both sides of the 
Atlantic reveals a complex picture.  Private enforcement will likely display 
signs of functional convergence in the United States and Europe—with 
consumers and other large, dispersed groups facing major obstacles to 
vindicating their rights.  In the longer term, some European Union Member 
States appear likely to enact stronger private rights of actions.  Importantly, 
private enforcement has to be examined in the context of overall 
enforcement—private and public.  For example, looking at an area of law 
that has been the focus of European reform, antitrust, the overall enforcement 
landscapes will be very different.  Given the limitations of public 
enforcement in the United States, the weakened private enforcement system 
will severely compromise overall enforcement.  In Europe, public 
enforcement is robust, so despite largely ineffective private enforcement in 
most Member States, overall enforcement will, in general, remain strong. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I examines the role of private 
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enforcement in deterring conduct harmful to the public.  Part II charts the rise 
of the big business-led campaign against private rights of action in the 1970s 
and 1980s in the United States.  Part III reviews how the federal courts, 
drawing on this “tort reform” rhetoric, have significantly curtailed private 
rights of action.  Moving across the Atlantic, Part IV describes the European 
Union’s mixed efforts to promote private enforcement and the influence of 
the corporate anti-civil justice narrative.  Part V presents a comparative 
analysis of private rights of action.  Part VI examines the interplay between 
public and private enforcement in the context of antitrust law in the United 
States and European Union. 
 
I. DETERRING HARMFUL CONDUCT THROUGH PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION 
 
A. Theory of Optimal Deterrence 
 
Economics offers insights on how to structure legal regimes to deter 
socially harmful conduct.  To deter damaging conduct “optimally,” the 
expected cost of engaging in the conduct should equal its net social harm.1  
The expected cost is the total value of the civil and criminal sanctions 
multiplied by the probability of detection multiplied by the probability of 
liability.  In mathematical terms, it can be expressed as: 
 
 optimal expected penalty = net harm 
expected penalty = legal penalties*p(detection)*p(liability) 
optimal expected penalties = optimal legal 
penalties*p(detection)*p(liability) 
optimal legal penalties = optimal expected 
penalties/[p(detection)*p(liability)] 
optimal legal penalties = net harm/[p(detection)*p(liability)] 
 
Even a strong penalty may be ineffective if enforcement mechanisms 
uncover and prosecute only a small percentage of wrongful behavior.  A 
numerical example illustrates how deterrence can be increased or decreased.  
Assume that a manufacturer can deprive workers of one million dollars in 
earned wages and bolster its own bottom-line.  The manufacturer has a fifty 
percent probability of being caught and held liable.  
 
 harm = $1,000,000 
 probability of being caught and held liable = 0.5 
 optimal penalty = $1,000,000/0.5 = $2,000,000 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
1 See, e.g., Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 180 (1968); William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 652, 656 (1983).  While it can inform policymaking, the optimal deterrence framework 
has drawn criticism for its narrow and reductionist view of human behavior.  See generally 
LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2010). 
308   UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW  Vol. 14, No. 2 
 
In this example, the government would have to impose a penalty of 
$2,000,000 to deter the manufacturer from engaging in wage theft.  If the 
penalty were lower and the probability of being caught and held liable 
remained constant, the manufacturer would have an incentive to steal wages 
because the gains would exceed the expected costs. 
To deter harmful conduct, policymakers can raise the penalties imposed, 
but can also increase the enforcement resources devoted to detecting and 
prosecuting the illegal behavior.  For example, staffing of enforcement 
authorities can be increased.  More “enforcers on the beat” raise the 
likelihood that wrongful conduct is detected and remedied through the 
administrative or judicial process.  And, of course, penalties and enforcement 
resources can be increased simultaneously.  
 
B. Private Enforcement Can Achieve Public Ends 
 
Public and private resources can be used in conjunction to achieve 
optimal deterrence.  Typically, a government agency is entrusted to enforce a 
particular set of laws across an entire society or a particular segment of the 
economy.  Private parties can also be empowered to file lawsuits and serve as 
“private attorneys general.”2 
The government is conventionally seen as the enforcer of laws and 
regulations.  Legislatures establish dedicated agencies to enforce, for 
example, environmental protection and securities laws.  In the United States, 
the government established the Environmental Protection Agency3 and 
Securities and Exchange Commission4 to enforce these laws.  These agencies 
employ attorneys, economists, and other experts to uncover and prosecute 
legal violations.  Government enforcers learn of possible violations through a 
number of means, including their own investigations as well as complaints 
from private parties.  If an investigation finds that legal action is warranted, 
agencies file complaints in court or a specialized administrative body. 
The government is not the only enforcer of laws, however.  Private 
parties, typically injured parties, can bring lawsuits against alleged 
wrongdoers, seeking monetary and non-monetary remedies.  Because every 
citizen is now a potential legal enforcement official, private enforcement has 
been described as “state power exercised through society.”5  
 
C. Private Enforcement Generates Public Benefits 
 
1. Deterrence: Private Enforcement Complements Public Enforcement 
 
In modern societies, even the most dedicated government agency is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
2 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972). 
3 Reorganization Plan No. 3, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (July 9, 1970). 
4 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–pp. 
5 SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE: PUBLIC REGULATION AND PRIVATE LAWSUITS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 9 (2010). 
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unlikely to have the resources to uncover all instances of illegal conduct.  
With large populations and complex economies, even a team of committed 
public enforcers cannot be expected to catch, let alone prosecute, every 
violation.  Take the securities laws as an example.  In today’s leading 
financial markets, millions of transactions involving millions of participants 
take place every day.6  A non-trivial fraction of securities fraud is bound to 
remain hidden from the eye of enforcers.  And during times of fiscal 
austerity, government budget cuts further diminish the ability of enforcement 
agencies to uncover wrongdoing.7  Smaller agency staffs mean that even 
some strong cases may be settled on suboptimal terms or not pursued at all.  
The limits of government enforcers extend beyond resource constraints.  
Government agencies can be subject to improper political influence.  The 
target of an investigation can undertake sustained lobbying to dampen an 
agency’s initiative.8  The wrongdoer can even engage in outright bribery of 
government officials.  Those that plead their case before the government are 
not likely to be representative of society; groups composed of a few large 
players (such as an oligopolistic industry) are much more likely to lobby than 
groups composed of a large number of players with small individual stakes 
(such as American consumers).9  The “revolving door” between industry and 
government can be another source of lax enforcement.  Government 
officials—who have worked in the regulated industry or expect to do so 
again—may identify strongly with market participants and adopt a 
permissive approach toward past and future clients and employers.10 
Ideology in the political branches of government can also lead to 
underenforcement of laws.  In presidential systems, both the legislature and 
the executive have tools at their disposal to dilute enforcement of laws that 
they dislike.  For example, the president can weaken an executive agency by 
appointing officials who bring fewer enforcement actions11 and write lenient 
rules for industry.12  For its part, Congress can starve an executive agency of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
6 At the New York Stock Exchange alone, anywhere between five hundred million and two 
billion shares have been traded every day in recent years.  See Daily NYSE Group Volume in 
NYSE Listed, 2015, NYSE MARKET DATA, 
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=3141&
category=3. 
7 Jim Snyder & Jim Rowley, Budget Deal Opens “Age of Austerity” for Federal Agencies, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 23, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-22/congress-
quick-fix-budget-only-dulls-pain-of-85-billion-in-cuts. 
8 Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Tripartism: Regulatory Capture and Empowerment, 16 L. & 
SOC. INQUIRY 435, 449 (1991). 
9 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 21–22 (1965). 
10 Edna Earle Vass Johnson, Agency “Capture”: The Revolving Door Between Regulated 
Industries and Their Regulating Agencies, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 95, 98 (1983). 
11 See, e.g., John Solomon & Juliet Eilperin, Bush’s EPA Is Pursuing Fewer Polluters, WASH. 
POST (Sep. 30, 2007). 
12 See, e.g., Ronald P. Jackson, Jr., Extending the Success of the Acid Rain Provisions of the 
Clean Air Act: An Analysis of the Clear Skies Initiative and Other Proposed Legislative and 
Regulatory Schemes to Curb Multi-Pollutant Emissions from Fossil Fueled Electric 
Generating Plants, 12 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 91, 107 (2005). 
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funding for enforcement.13  
In light of the real limitations on public enforcement, private rights of 
action can play an important complementary function.  Public enforcement, 
due to resource constraints, political pressure, and ideological considerations, 
cannot realistically be entrusted to enforce laws and regulations at the 
optimal level.  Private enforcement, which relies on the collective ability and 
initiative of the population, can compensate for the shortcomings of 
government enforcement.  Because private plaintiffs are neither dependent 
on government budgets nor constrained by the ideological biases of the 
political branches of government, they can be expected to enforce laws in a 
more consistent manner over time. 
Public enforcement officials themselves have recognized the value of 
private rights of actions.  A head of the Antitrust Division in the Truman 
Administration described private actions as being “of substantial help” to the 
antitrust mission.14  He added: “[I]f you did away with the triple damages suit 
entirely and still wanted substantial enforcement . . . you would have to 
quadruple the size of the Antitrust Division.”15  In a 2013 amicus brief filed 
jointly by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission in the 
Supreme Court, the two agencies wrote that “[p]rivate actions are a vital 
supplement to government enforcement not only under the antitrust laws, but 
also under a wide range of other statutes.”16  Similarly, European public 
authorities have acknowledged that they realistically cannot carry the entire 
burden of detecting and punishing illegal behavior.17 
Empirical research has found that private enforcement generates 
significant deterrence of socially harmful behavior.  Joshua Davis and Robert 
Lande studied sixty antitrust cases between 1990 and 2011 in which plaintiffs 
either won at trial or reached settlements with defendants.18  In the cases 
reviewed, they found that the relief obtained by private plaintiffs produced 
substantial deterrence value, often in excess of public fines.19  These sixty 
cases generated monetary recoveries three times greater than the civil and 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
13 See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER LEONARD, THE MEAT RACKET: THE SECRET TAKEOVER OF 
AMERICA’S FOOD BUSINESS 301 (2014). 
14 Study of Monopoly Power: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82 Cong. Rec. 
15 (1951) (Statement of H. Graham Morison, Assistant Att’y Gen. in charge of the Dep’t of 
Justice, Antitrust Div.). 
15 Id. 
16 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, American Express 
Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant , 133 S. Ct. 2304, at 55 (2013) (No. 12-133). 
17 See, e.g., OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, PRIVATE ACTIONS IN COMPETITION LAW: EFFECTIVE 
REDRESS FOR CONSUMERS AND BUSINESS 15–16 (2007) (“Since there are . . . inevitably cases 
which the competition authorities do not pursue, consumers who do not have the resources or 
skills to pursue redress on their own are disadvantaged vis-à-vis infringing undertakings.”) 
[hereinafter OFT, PRIVATE ACTIONS]. 
18 Robert H. Lande & Joshua P. Davis, Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement 
and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 315, 318 (2011); 
Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of 
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1271 (2013). 
19 Lande & Davis, Comparative Deterrence, supra note 18, at 336–37. 
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criminal penalties obtained by U.S. public enforcers in all cartel cases during 
the same twenty-one year period, even when prison terms for individuals are 
monetized.20  Their analysis used assumptions that, if anything, were strongly 
biased in favor of the relief obtained by the government.21 
Private rights of action have been shown to produce substantial public 
benefits in other areas of law, as well.22  In employment discrimination and 
fair housing law, Michael Selmi has shown that private plaintiffs bring many 
more cases, advance more aggressive legal theories, and seek more 
substantial remedies than federal enforcers do.23  James Cox and Randall 
Thomas have uncovered similar patterns in the enforcement of securities law.  
While they credit the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) for 
improving its enforcement priorities after the collapse of Enron,24 they also 
found that between 1997 and 2002 private plaintiffs went after larger 
defendants, who likely inflicted greater harm on investors, than the SEC 
did.25  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, in a recent study of 
litigation involving consumer financial products between 2010 and 2012, 
found that for sixty-eight percent of the examined class actions there was no 
corresponding public enforcement action.26  Even when there were 
overlapping public and private actions, the private cases preceded the public 
ones in most instances.27 
Governments do not face a binary choice of either public or private 
enforcement.  Instead, they can use both mechanisms to promote optimal 
deterrence of harmful conduct.  Public and private enforcement each have 
their strengths.  Government agencies are likely better suited to bringing 
complex, resource-intensive enforcement actions.  Because every member of 
a society is a potential enforcer and not dependent on the public purse, 
however, private enforcers are less susceptible to changes in the political 
winds and more likely to exercise constant vigilance.  Public and private 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
20 Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for Private 
Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2013). 
21 See Davis & Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment, supra note 18, at 
1296 (“We show that only if one disvalues a year in prison as greater than $43-48 million 
would DOJ anti-cartel enforcement deter more anti-competitive conduct than private 
enforcement.”); id. at 1301 (“It also should be noted that the victims in the cases we studied 
sometimes received products, coupons, or discounts.  The methodology of our study was to be 
conservative by not counting the compensatory effects of products, coupons, discounts or rate 
reductions.”). 
22 See generally J. Maria Glover, The Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in 
Public Law, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1137 (2012). 
23 Michael Selmi, Public vs. Private Enforcement of Civil Rights: The Case of Housing and 
Employment, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1401, 1404 (1998). 
24 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Public and Private Enforcement of the Securities 
Laws: Have Things Changed Since Enron?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 893, 906–07 (2004). 
25 James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 
53 DUKE L.J. 737, 777–78 (2002). 
26 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY § 9.4 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB 
ARBITRATION STUDY], http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-
report-to-congress-2015.pdf. 
27 Id. at § 9.4.1–2.  
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enforcement should be seen as complements that are both important to 
deterring harmful behavior. 
 
2. Private Rights of Action Serve an Important Compensatory Function 
 
In addition to their deterrence benefits, private rights of action produce 
significant public value through their compensatory function.  If public 
enforcement could achieve optimal deterrence, it would, as presently 
constituted, still fail to provide redress to injured parties.  Obviously, prison 
sentences for guilty individuals fail to provide any (monetary) compensation 
to victims.  Civil and criminal fines typically go to the government treasury, 
rather than to those harmed by illegal conduct.28  And the social safety net 
may, at most, provide only partial relief for affected individuals.  
Private rights of action play a vital compensatory function.  Money 
obtained through litigation can supplement social insurance programs and 
provide immediate assistance to injured parties.  Damages can cover lost 
wages, costs of medical care, and emotional distress arising from another 
party’s unlawful conduct.  Similarly, victims of wage theft, antitrust, and 
securities violations can recover the money they would have earned or 
retained but for illegal market behavior.  
The money recovered by injured parties through private lawsuits is 
substantial.  A study of over one thousand class actions from 1990 to 2003 
found that settlements generate substantial compensation for victims of 
illegal behavior.  On average, 81.6 cents of every dollar recovered went to 
class members, meaning that less than twenty percent of the settlement funds 
went to attorneys’ fees and administrative expenses.29  In comparison, an 
attorney in a personal injury lawsuit typically can obtain a contingent fee of 
thirty to forty percent of the final award.30  In their case study of sixty 
successful private antitrust actions, Davis and Lande found that consumers 
and competitors injured by anticompetitive conduct recovered approximately 
thirty-five billion dollars,31 with twenty percent of the total covering legal 
and administrative costs.32  And this figure understates the redress obtained; 
the authors did not attempt to value the discounts, coupons, and other relief 
that are more difficult to quantify in monetary terms.33  The Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau found that between 2010 and 2012 class actions 
provided gross monetary and in-kind relief of $2.7 billion to consumers 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
28 This is, of course, not universally true.  E.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 
CFPB Takes Action to Obtain $120 Million in Redress from Sprint and Verizon for Illegal 
Mobile Cramming (May 12, 2015), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/cfpb-takes-
action-to-obtain-120-million-in-redress-from-sprint-and-verizon-for-illegal-mobile-
cramming/. 
29 Myriam Gilles & Gary B. Friedman, Exploding the Class Action Costs Myth: The Social 
Utility of Entrepreneurial Lawyers, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 103, 131 (2006). 
30 Id. 
31 Davis & Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment, supra note 18, at 1273. 
32 Id. at 1309. 
33 Id. at 1310. 
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injured by illegal conduct in six financial services markets.34  Attorneys’ fees 
and administrative costs accounted for $489 million, or roughly eighteen 
percent of the total.35 
 
D. Effective Private Enforcement Requires Proper Incentives for 
Plaintiffs 
 
To promote effective private enforcement, governments must establish 
the proper incentives for parties to bring suits.  Litigation can be a very costly 
undertaking so the expected benefits must be correspondingly large.  A 
statutory private right of action is likely to be a dead letter if it imposes costly 
procedural burdens and provides for only modest recoveries for successful 
plaintiffs. 
Sean Farhang has set out an analytical framework for understanding the 
incentives for private plaintiffs.36  A successful lawsuit results in a plaintiff 
obtaining relief, which can be both monetary and non-monetary.37  Common 
forms of relief include compensatory damages, punitive damages, restitution, 
and injunctions.  Of course, non-monetary relief that does not have an 
explicit dollar figure attached to it can still be of tremendous value to 
parties.38  The sum total of the potential relief is a plaintiff’s benefit from 
litigation.  Because a plaintiff is not guaranteed to win his or her case, the 
possible benefits from litigation have to be discounted by the probability of 
success.  As for costs, plaintiffs typically have to incur various expenses 
including attorneys’ fees, filing fees, expert fees, and the costs of taking 
discovery.  In mathematical terms, a plaintiff’s benefit-cost analysis can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
 EV = expected value of lawsuit 
 B = value of relief from successful lawsuit 
 p(success) = probability of successful lawsuit 
 C = costs of lawsuit 
 EV = B*p(success) - C39 
 
For a plaintiff to file a lawsuit, the expected value (EV) must be a 
positive value.  A party is unlikely to pursue litigation if its expected value is 
negative.  And even if the expected value is positive, the value has to be 
sufficiently large to make litigation worthwhile.  If a potential lawsuit has 
costs of $1,000,000 and has expected benefits of $1,000,100, few plaintiffs 
are likely to file a claim.  If the “rate of return” is too small, parties and their 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
34 CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 26, at § 8.3.3. 
35 Id. 
36 FARHANG, supra note 5, at 22. 
37 Id. 
38 Id.  
39 Id. 
314   UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW  Vol. 14, No. 2 
 
attorneys are unlikely to “invest” in a case.40  In the described hypothetical, 
the suit has an expected rate of return of 0.01 percent—a return lower than 
even what savings accounts offer under today’s very low interest rates.41 
State actors can encourage and discourage private enforcement, exerting 
influence over the level of deterrence that a private enforcement regime 
provides.  First, when adopting a private enforcement mechanism for a 
particular law, legislators can actively adjust the inputs into the private 
enforcement equation to engineer the preferred level of private 
enforcement.42   
Consider the inputs associated with bringing suit: the expected benefit, 
the probability of success, and the expected cost.  Legislators can enhance 
and reduce the expected benefit of a private right of action through assorted 
means.  Who can bring a lawsuit is closely related to expected benefits.  If an 
individual can bring suit only in his or her individual capacity, litigation may 
frequently be unattractive.  The costs of litigation are likely to swamp the 
value of even the largest possible recovery in many cases.  In contrast, if an 
individual can file a representative or class action—a suit on behalf of herself 
as well as thousands of other persons who have suffered a similar harm—the 
benefit-cost analysis may be different.  Similarly, organizations, such as 
those representing consumers, can be authorized to bring a lawsuit on behalf 
of all their members.  In both scenarios, the common costs of litigation can 
be spread among thousands of parties and turn low, or negative, value 
individual suits into a single group claim with a large expected positive 
value. 
In addition, lawmakers exercise control over the prospective aggregate 
effect of a suit under the statute.  They could establish opt-out class actions in 
which similarly situated individuals (the “class members”) are bound by the 
judgment in a class suit unless the class members opt out in advance.  Or 
legislators could impose an opt-in requirement in which individuals 
affirmatively have to opt in to join the suit, which would depress the number 
of class members, decreasing the potential benefit. 
Damages are another area in which legislators can change the benefits of 
bringing suit.43  Legislators could increase the benefit by enhancing the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
40 See id. 
41 See, e.g., Bank Account Interest Rates, BANK OF AMERICA, 
https://www.bankofamerica.com/deposits/bank-account-interest-rates.go (last visited Apr. 5, 
2016) (0.03% annual percentage yield (APY)); Rates, CITIGROUP, 
https://online.citi.com/US/JRS/pands/detail.do?ID=CurrentRates (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) 
(APY between 0.01% and 0.10%); Savings Accounts and CD (Time Account) Rates, WELLS 
FARGO, https://www.wellsfargo.com/savings-cds/rates (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (0.01% 
APY); Chase Savings Interest Rate, JPMORGAN CHASE, 
https://www.chase.com/savings/savings-account-rates (last visited Apr. 5, 2016) (0.01% 
APY). 
42 See generally  FARHANG, supra note 5, at 21–31 (“[A] key lever legislators use . . . is to 
determine the expected value of claims (EV) by manipulating expected benefits (EB), 
probability of prevailing (p), and expected costs (EC).”). 
43 Id. at 27.   
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damages available to a prevailing plaintiff through, for instance, the 
provision of statutory or treble damages.  They can also reduce the expected 
benefit by barring the availability of damages altogether and permitting 
plaintiffs to only seek declaratory or injunctive relief.   
Legislators can increase the probability of success by limiting the 
elements required to state a claim, broadening the scope of discovery, and 
extending statutes of limitations.  By the same token, legislators can decrease 
the probability of success by requiring plaintiffs to establish several legal 
elements and demanding more stringent proof to ultimately prevail.   
As to expected cost, legislators can decrease the expected cost by 
mandating one-way fee-shifting by which prevailing plaintiffs would be 
entitled to their attorneys’ fees from defendants, but defendants would not be 
entitled to attorneys’ fees should they prevail.  Legislators can increase 
expected cost by instituting a “loser pays” rule in which the losing side pays 
the fees and costs of the prevailing side.  “Loser pays” makes plaintiffs, 
particularly those of modest means, reluctant to pursue all but the most 
airtight claims and necessitates costly pre-suit investigations.  Ultimately, the 
interplay of all three factors—the expected benefit, the probability of 
success, and the expected cost of bringing suit—dictate whether a suit is 
brought.44  
Second, once a private right of action is in place and its general 
parameters have been defined, other government institutions can alter its 
effects, sometimes dramatically.  The judiciary is the principal actor that can 
subsequently change the equation.  The legislature could try and craft a 
statute to have a small or large potential aggregate effect, but judges have 
appreciable discretion to construe the statute in a manner that amplifies or 
diminishes the legislative vision.  In the United States, civil procedure is 
trans-substantive, permitting judges to modify procedure and impact 
substantive rights across many areas of law.45  For instance, a judge could 
apply onerous pleading requirements that force plaintiffs to plead minutiae to 
survive a motion to dismiss.  Such a policy would increase the costs of 
litigation for plaintiffs and reduce the probability of success.  Another 
element of procedure that could be of large import is the ease—or 
difficulty—of bringing class actions on behalf of a large number of injured 
parties. 
 
II. THE UNITED STATES’ ONCE STRONG CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM HAS BEEN 
WEAKENED BY INDUSTRY’S “TORT REFORM” CAMPAIGN  
 
A. The United States’ Private Enforcement Tradition and Its Decline 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
44 See generally id. at 28–31.  
45 Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedural Theory, 61 OKLA. L. 
REV. 319, 324 (2008). 
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The United States has a rich legacy of private enforcement.  In Marbury 
v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall proclaimed: “The very essence of 
civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the 
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”46  This 
understanding was gospel from America’s earliest days.47   
Private enforcement has long provided not just a remedy for injured 
individuals, but also deterred harmful conduct.  With limited public law 
enforcement capacity, early American colonies relied on private citizens to 
enforce law through qui tam statutes, which empowered whistleblowers to 
file suit on behalf of the government (and share in the proceeds) when they 
had information about statutory violations and frauds on the public 
treasury.48  To this day, qui tam remains a vital tool in combating waste, 
fraud and abuse.49  More generally, private enforcement today acts as “an 
indispensable satellite regulatory system that augments and sometimes serves 
as a substitute for the work of official governmental agencies.”50 
The civil justice system is in decline, however, thanks to a campaign led 
by private industry.  Since the 1970s, corporate America has waged a largely 
successful war to roll back private rights of action that protect all Americans 
from harmful conduct in the market and society.  
 
B. The Powell Memo: A Battle Plan for Undermining Business 
Regulation 
 
Perhaps no document better captures the mentality and strategic plan of 
industry than a memorandum written by Lewis F. Powell Jr. in 1971, just two 
months prior to his nomination as a Supreme Court Justice.51  At that time, 
Mr. Powell was a well-regarded corporate attorney who defended the tobacco 
industry in numerous suits and sat on the board of Philip Morris.52   
The confidential memo written for the Chamber of Commerce, entitled 
“Attack on the American Free Enterprise System,” is a call to arms to 
American business.53  It alleged that private industry—and, indeed, the free 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
46 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
47 Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1486 (1987) 
(“[T]hat every person should have a judicial remedy for every legal injury done him was a 
common provision in the bills of rights of state constitutions; [and] was invoked by The 
Federalist No. 43 in a passage whose very casualness indicated its uncontroversial quality.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
48 CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., QUI TAM: THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED 
FEDERAL STATUTES 3, 3 n.14 (2009), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40785.pdf (listing a 
number of colonial-era qui tam statutes). 
49 Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2002).   
50 Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: 
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 301 (2013).   
51 KIM M. PHILLIPS-FEIN, INVISIBLE HANDS: THE MAKING OF THE CONSERVATIVE MOVEMENT 
FROM THE NEW DEAL TO REAGAN 156–65 (2009) (providing background).   
52 Id at 15657.  
53 Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, 
Educ. Comm., U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Attack on American Free Enterprise System 1 
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market system itself—was under relentless attack by “the Communists, New 
Leftists and other revolutionaries”54 who were “far more numerous, better 
financed, and increasingly . . . more welcomed and encouraged by other 
elements of society, than ever before in our history.”55  The ostensibly radical 
message had resonated with, and enjoyed amplification from, mainstream 
institutions—including universities, the media, and legislators.56  The 
troubling results were reflected in “the stampedes by politicians to support 
almost any legislation related to ‘consumerism’ or to the ‘environment’”57 
and the litigation successes enjoyed “at business’ expense” by “labor unions, 
civil rights groups and . . . the public interest law firms . . . extremely active 
in the judicial arena.”58  Yet, in Powell’s view, industry sat idly by as its 
attackers added to their ranks, including through television, which “play[ed] 
such a predominant role in shaping the thinking, attitudes and emotions of 
our people.”59 
To reshape public opinion,60 Powell proposed a multipronged response 
by industry that would be led by the Chamber of Commerce.61  The plan of 
action focused on four fronts: media, education, politics and law.   
As to the last of these, the law, Powell stressed that the judiciary had 
affected American business as much as any branch of government.  In fact, 
the structure of the American system prompted Powell to conclude “the 
judiciary may be the most important instrument for social, economic and 
political change.”62  Consequently, judicial action represented a “vast area of 
opportunity” for which businesses should provide generous funding. 63 
Industry heeded the call to arms, mobilizing its resources from the 1970s 
onward to mold public opinion and public policy.  Between 1968 and 1978, 
the number of corporations with public affairs offices in Washington D.C. 
grew fivefold.64  Corporate Political Action Committees (“PACs”) grew 
fourfold in number between 1976 and the mid-1980s.65  And the number of 
firms with registered lobbyists in the city grew by a remarkable multiple of 
fifteen, from 175 to 2,500.66  Alongside greater participation came stronger 
organization as well.  For example, the Chamber of Commerce, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
(Aug. 23, 1971) [hereinafter “Powell, Jr. Memorandum”], 
http://law2.wlu.edu/deptimages/Powell%20Archives/PowellMemorandumTypescript.pdf. 
54 Id. at 2. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 2–3.   
57 Id. at 25.  
58 Id. at 26–27.   
59 Powell, Jr. Memorandum, supra note 53, at 3.  
60 Id. at 20 (beginning the section with the apt title: “What Can Be Done About the Public?”).  
61 Id. at 11–12.   
62 Id. at 26. 
63 Id. at 27. 
64 JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE 
THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 118 (2010).  
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
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Powell urged to take the lead on these matters, saw its budget triple and 
membership double between 1974 and 1980.67 
 
C. Waging War: The Propagation of Business Victimhood Mythology to 
Turn Public Opinion Against Civil Justice and Thwart Private Enforcement  
 
Drawing inspiration from the Powell Memo, corporations and 
conservative activists adopted a strategy to turn public opinion against the 
civil justice system by launching a pro-industry crusade in media, politics, 
education and courts themselves.68  This “tort reform” campaign deployed a 
common rhetorical mythology of business victimhood.  Business victimhood 
was poll-tested and anchored in the ideas that: (1) businesses are victims of a 
litigation explosion and (2) litigation is an immoral and unjust method of 
dispute resolution.  Businesses are victims, the narrative goes, of trial 
lawyers who play “jackpot justice” by drumming up frivolous litigation,69 of 
runaway juries who have never seen a damage award too large, and of 
Americans who file lawsuits for every injury no matter how small.  
According to the mythology, the result has been an overly litigious society 
that imposes massive burdens on American business and, by extension, 
American consumers and workers.  
 
1. Litigation Trends in Recent American History 
 
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed an expansion of rights for groups long 
denied them, including racial minorities and women, or protected 
incompletely, such as consumers and workers.70  A new generation of 
attorneys engaged in public interest litigation to ensure that the new laws 
translated into concrete realities on the ground.71  The upshot was that 
litigation increased.72 
There was no general “litigation explosion,” however.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that the increase in litigation in the 1970s was modest.73  
And, in the decades that followed, litigation rates tapered off.74  Perhaps 
more importantly, there is no evidence of any rise in frivolous litigation.  
Overall litigation rates are presently comparable to those in other periods of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
67 Id. at 119.   
68 See Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 
162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1553 (2014).   
69 Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform, 54 DUKE L. J. 447, 450 
(2004).     
70 Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice 
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 717–18 (1998). 
71 STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT 23, 30, 54 (2008). 
72 Galanter, supra note 70, at 717–18. 
73 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 992 n. 42 (2003) (collecting sources). 
74 Id. at 992–93 n. 43 (collecting sources).   
2015 A VIEW ACROSS THE ATLANTIC                         319 
 
American history and consistent, on a per-capita basis, with those of other 
industrialized countries.75  
Since the late 1960s, there has, however, been a historically and 
culturally distinctive rise in one type of litigation: class actions.  This is the 
byproduct of changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966, which 
expressly authorized opt-out class actions for damages.76  Although class 
action litigation has increased markedly, there is no evidence to substantiate 
the view that it is largely frivolous.  Two critiques are typically leveled 
against class actions: (1) class members receive too little;77 and (2) the mere 
threat of a large class damage award blackmails defendants into settling.  
Neither has an empirical basis.  As to the first point, substantial evidence 
exists to the contrary.78  As to the second, the best evidence once again 
suggests that it is actually plaintiffs who are systematically disadvantaged 
vis-à-vis corporate defendants in contemporary class action litigation.79  
 
2. The Mythology of Business Victimhood 
 
If the record shows that there has not been a discernible uptick in overall 
litigation and that class action litigation is mostly beneficial, what explains 
the conventional wisdom to the contrary?  In this instance, power is 
knowledge.  That is, powerful sources have fostered the common 
“knowledge” that litigation is out-of-control.  Specifically, with the support 
of industry, business victimhood mythology has been broadcast in media, 
politics, education, and courts themselves, just as the Powell Memo advised.  
First, private industry has poured tens of millions of dollars into 
spreading business victimhood mythology through public relations 
campaigns.80  In the 1970s, insurance companies took out advertisements in 
popular print magazines to condemn the purported litigation explosion.81  
One, for example, read “‘[w]hen anything goes wrong with me . . . somebody 
is going to pay! They owe me!’ Who is this somebody? ‘It's you!’”82  A 
study conducted contemporaneously with the placement of the ads found that 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
75 Id. at 993–94.  
76 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
1787, at 210–11(2d ed. 1986). 
77 Courts must remain vigilant when certifying that settlements are fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.  See, e.g., Eubank v. Pella Corp., 753 F.3d 718, 721 (7th Cir. 2014) (“The case 
underscores the importance both of objectors (for they are the appellants in this case—without 
them there would have been no appellate challenge to the settlement) and of intense judicial 
scrutiny of proposed class action settlements.”). 
78 See supra Part I.C.2.  
79 Christine P. Bartholomew, Redefining Prey and Predator in Class Actions, 80 BROOK. L. 
REV. 743, 773 (2015). 
80 Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The Impact That It Has Had Is Between People's Ears:" 
Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453, 460 (2000).   
81 Id. at 453. 
82 Id. (quoting ad presented in Elizabeth Loftus, Insurance Advertising and Jury Awards, 65 
A.B.A. J. 69 (1979)). 
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“even a single exposure to one of these ads can dramatically lower the 
amount of award a juror is willing to give.”83   
Starting in the 1980s, industry refined its efforts to shape public attitudes 
in support of its anti-litigation efforts.84  Armed with new sampling data, 
insurance companies initiated a multi-million dollar campaign across media 
platforms with the aim of reaching ninety percent of adults in the country.85  
The campaign was anchored in the concept of a “Lawsuit Crisis” and 
explained that present-day litigation inflicted harm not just on corporations, 
but also on pregnant mothers, high school athletes, and church 
congregations.86  It deliberately cast plaintiffs who used the legal system to 
vindicate their rights as confrontational, immoral, and attacking bedrock 
American values. 
A parallel campaign at the time led by just one insurance company, 
Aetna, reinforced the notion that corporations are victims of the judicial 
system.  One advertisement reminded viewers of the infamous, though highly 
misleading,87 tale of the McDonald’s coffee lawsuit, stating “[w]hen a 
woman riding in an automobile spills hot coffee on her lap, then sues the 
restaurant where she bought the coffee, something is wrong.”88  Other 
industries jumped on the bandwagon and amplified the message throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s.89  Their message has become the conventional 
wisdom.90  As one scholar put it, “[w]e believe America is the most litigious 
society on earth not because this is true, but because the media have told us 
so over and over again.  We believe . . . our fellow citizens have a shameless 
propensity to file frivolous lawsuits . . . because our newspapers and 
television shows inundate our collective consciousness with 
[unrepresentative] examples of outrageous and ridiculous litigation.”91  
Second, starting in the 1980s, officials at the highest levels of 
government propagated business victimhood mythology.  Myriam Gilles 
observed that:  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
83 Id. at 456 n. 11.  
84 Id. at 461–64. 
85 Id. at 467.   
86 Daniels & Martin, supra note 80, at 467. 
87 For a summary of the misleading character of attacks on the McDonald’s lawsuit, see 
RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST: CORPORATE LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION 
OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 267–72 (1996) (detailing the third degree burns suffered by the elderly 
plaintiff from 180-degree coffee and the 700 other burn cases from McDonald’s coffee that 
jurors learned of).  The story was also featured in the popular HBO documentary Hot Coffee.    
88 Daniels & Martin, supra note 80, at 461–64. 
89 Deborah L. Rhode, Frivolous Litigation and Civil Justice Reform: Miscasting the Problem, 
Recasting the Solution, 54 DUKE L.J. 447, 451–52 (2004).   
90 Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science, 100 
W. VA. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (2008); Theodore Eisenberg, The Empirical Effects of Tort 
Reform, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF TORTS (Jennifer Arlen ed., 
forthcoming), http:// ssrn.com/abstract=2032740.   
91 Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery 
Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1395–96 
(1994). 
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[T]he Reagan Administration provided a nourishing home for all of 
these anti-lawsuit reformers. . . .  Under the new president, the 
Republican Party “began to recognize the value of assaulting legal 
liberalism as a strategy” for whipping up their base, and it capitalized 
on the convenient narrative that lawyers were “destroying 
America.”92   
 
Some in Congress attempted to advance legislation to address the perceived 
problem.93  For example, Republican Senator Orrin Hatch pressed for a law 
to eliminate statutory fee-shifting rules because they had allegedly created 
“exorbitant windfalls for lawyers” responsible for the “explosion of 
litigation.”94   
In 1989, Vice President Dan Quayle took the helm of the Council on 
Competitiveness, which had been established by President Reagan and 
focused heavily on the mitigation of litigation’s impact on business.95  When 
accepting the Republican nomination for vice president at the party’s 
national convention in 1992, Vice President Quayle proclaimed: “[O]ur legal 
system is spinning out of control. . . .  [O]ur legal system is costing 
consumers $300 billion dollars a year.  The litigation explosion has damaged 
our competitiveness; it has wiped out jobs.”96  Subsequent generations of 
conservative leaders have echoed this rhetoric.  For instance, President 
George W. Bush frequently denounced “frivolous lawsuits.”97   
As the business victimhood mythology percolates in political circles, few 
have risen to offer a corrective.  Prominent Democrats have often chosen to 
either lend their own support or remain silent.  The result is that the popular 
discourse is one-sided and replete with distorted facts shaped by powerful 
lobbies. 
Third, legal academia has supplied an intellectual framework buttressing 
business victimhood mythology.  For instance, the ascendancy of the law and 
economics movement in legal academia and jurisprudence has provided 
fertile ground for business victimhood mythology to thrive.  The field of law 
and economics emerged in the 1970s and grew rapidly from the 1980s 
onward with generous funding from industry-friendly sources such as the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
92 See Myriam E. Gilles, The End of Doctrine: Private Arbitration, Public Law and the Anti-
Lawsuit Movement 6 (Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 436, August 28, 2014), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2488575.  Before he was President, Reagan described public interest 
lawyers as “a bunch of ideological ambulance chasers doing their own thing at the expense of 
the . . . poor who actually need help.”  Ronald J. Ostrow, Legal Services Agency Battles 
Reagan Attempt to Cut Off Its Funding, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 12, 1981, at B1. 
93 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 68, at 1567. 
94 Id.   
95 Vice President Dan Quayle, In Their Own Words; Excerpts from Vice President Quayle’s 
Address, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992. 
96 Id.  
97 See, e.g., Federal Trials Decline for Injury Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2005, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/17/AR2005081702002.html.  
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Olin Foundation.98  Stephen Subrin and Thomas Main observe that “[t]he 
movement’s emphasis on wealth maximization and efficiency fits easily into, 
and readily supported, the conservative agenda to reduce regulation and 
curtail civil litigation.”99  For example, professors use the law and economics 
framework to advocate limitations on class actions, reasoning that class 
certification creates undue pressure on defendants to settle since they may 
face immense exposure.100  While law and economics need not be biased in a 
pro-corporate direction, the movement in general has tended to support 
research and commentary skewed toward industry.101  
Finally, industry has achieved its greatest successes, and witnessed the 
most potent amplification of its business victimhood messaging, in the courts 
themselves. After the growth of public interest litigation in the 1960s, 
industry and political conservatives made activism in the judiciary their top 
priority.102  Jurists and lawyers often reflected industry’s rhetoric.  In 1976, 
Robert Bork wrote that “[w]e are sitting in the center of an explosion of 
federal litigation,”103 while Francis R. Kirkham, then chair of the Antitrust 
Section of the American Bar Association, “stridently complained about 
notice pleading, juries, class actions, abusive discovery, and forced 
settlement of meritless claims due to the high cost of litigating.”104  Judge 
Bork laid blame for the litigation explosion on an imprudent expansion of 
government.105   
Chief Justice Warren Burger, whom some credit with coining the phrase 
“litigation explosion,”106 opined that American litigiousness represented a 
form of “mass neurosis”107 stemming from communal decay of values with 
courts “expected to fill the void created by the decline of church, family, and 
neighborhood unity.”108  Chief Justice Burger’s sociological analysis, while 
provocative, was not supported with real world evidence.109  It did, however, 
have the effect of providing elite imprimatur to industry attacks on the civil 
justice system. 
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(1975). 
104 Subrin & Main, supra note 98, at 1864.   
105 Bork, supra note 103, at 238–39.  
106 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 68, at 1588. 
107 Warren E. Burger, Remarks to the American Arbitration Association, in DELIVERY OF 
JUSTICE 27, 29 (1990).   
108 Warren E. Burger, Isn’t There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A.J. 274, 275 (1982).  
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Stephen Burbank and Sean Farhang examined the link between the votes 
Justices cast on private enforcement issues and the Justices’ ideological 
preferences from 1970 to 2013.110  They found that a Justice’s ideology 
strongly correlated with his or her votes on private enforcement issues: “The 
conservative-liberal dichotomy . . . perfectly divides our ratio of pro-private 
enforcement votes in the following sense: every ‘conservative’ has a lower 
pro-private enforcement voting rate than every ‘liberal.’”111  Due to the 
Supreme Court’s rightward shift, pro-private enforcement outcomes have 
dropped precipitously over time.112  The four most conservative members of 
the Court during the 2015 term—Justices Thomas, Scalia, Alito and 
Roberts113—also had the four most anti-private enforcement scores of all 
Justices in the study.114  Today, outcomes in business cases at the Supreme 
Court closely align with the positions taken by the Chamber of Commerce’s 
formidable legal lobby.115  Somewhere, Lewis Powell is smiling.  
 
III. U.S. COURTS HAVE DRAWN ON INDUSTRY RHETORIC TO RESTRICT 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT  
 
In recent decades, federal courts in the United States have lowered the 
expected value of bringing private lawsuits.  The courts have reduced the 
probability and benefits of success and also raised the costs of litigation.  
These seemingly technical changes to procedural rules have undermined the 
efficacy of private enforcement.116  It is particularly troubling that these 
developments have been justified with rhetoric that echoes industry talking 
points, including the myth of business victimhood.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
110 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 68, at 1570–80.   
111 Id. at 1573.   
112 Id. at 1574.  
113 Id. at 1573.  
114 Id.  It is telling that Justices Roberts and Scalia vocally advocated for (ultimately 
unsuccessful) legislative restrictions on private enforcement during the Reagan era.  Id. at 
1554.  In essence, that which could not be accomplished through the political arena was 
accomplished through a conservative judiciary. 
115 Paul D. Carrington, Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 S.C. L. REV. 637, 637 
(2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court has been captured by the Chamber of Commerce.”); Edward A. 
Purcell, Jr., From the Particular to the General: Three Federal Rules and the Jurisprudence of 
the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1731, 1742 n.52 (2014) (collecting 
sources).    
116 The changes elaborated in this Article represent the lion’s share of the ways in which 
private enforcement has been curtailed.  There are, however, additional sources, including the 
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure, which private industry successfully lobbied 
to impose limitations on discovery through incorporation of a “proportionality” requirement 
and elimination of generous language that relevant discovery need only “appear[] reasonably 
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory 
committee’s note to 2015 amendment; Patricia W. Moore, Chief Justice’s Year-End Report 
Praises Rules Amendments Sought by Corporate Defendants LAW PROFESSOR BLOGS 
NETWORK (Jan. 2, 2016), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/civpro/2016/01/chief-justices-
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A. Decline in the Probability of Success: Pleading Standards. 
 
Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires plaintiffs to 
articulate in their complaint “a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”117  The rule’s language reflects 
the view of the drafters of the original 1938 Federal Rules that liberal notice 
pleading should be the norm.118  Under “notice pleading,” a pleading need 
only contain enough factual information for the opposing party to proffer a 
coherent response.119  In deliberately adopting notice pleading, the drafters 
eschewed the technicality rife in the prior common law and code pleading 
regimes,120 rebuffing “attempts to identify ‘facts’ as opposed to ‘conclusions’ 
[in pleadings], and preferring discovery to pleading as the means to ascertain 
what happened.”121   
Although under pressure from some quarters to return to previous 
pleading systems, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Procedure long 
rejected such efforts, as did the Supreme Court, which is reflected in the 
once-canonical Conley v. Gibson.122  There, the Court reaffirmed that a 
complaint merely had to “give the defendant fair notice of what the 
plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests”123 and that it “should 
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt 
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief”124  For the next fifty years, the pleading 
requirements remained essentially unchanged.125 
Starting in 2007, however, the Court reversed course, imposing stringent 
new requirements on pleading.  It ushered in a new, heightened “plausibility” 
pleading standard in Bell Atlantic Corp v. Twombly126 and Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal.127  A principal effect of Twombly and Iqbal has been to decrease the 
probability of plaintiff success because many plaintiffs are unable to present 
sufficiently specific facts at the suit’s inception and before discovery, to 
survive dismissal. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
117 FED. R. CIV. P. 8.   
118 See Michael E. Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
85 YALE L.J. 914, 917 (1976).   
119 Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 
(1947).   
120 Thompson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 476 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir.1973) (summarizing this shift 
and stating that “[a]ncestor worship in the form of ritualistic pleadings has no more disciples. 
The time when the slip of a sergeant's quill pen could spell death for a plaintiff's cause of 
action is past.  Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint is not an 
anagrammatic exercise in which the pleader must find just exactly the prescribed combination 
of words and phrases.”). 
121 Burbank & Farhang, supra note 68, at 1604.     
122 355 U.S. 41 (1957). 
123 Id. at 47.   
124 Id. at 45–46.    
125 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002).    
126 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 
127 556 U.S. 662 (2009).   
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In Twombly, the Court found that, at least in antitrust cases like the one 
before it, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitle[ment] 
to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”128  Rather, “[f]actual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative 
level,”129 and plaintiffs must plead “enough facts to state a claim for relief 
that is plausible on its face.”130  In Iqbal, the Supreme Court made clear that 
the plausibility pleading standard was not limited to the antitrust context and 
applied across all civil cases.  The decision explicitly affirmed the language 
of Twombly, and added that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 8 
“demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed me 
accusation,”131 instructing that a complaint should be dismissed when it 
contains “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”132  
Troublingly, in reaching the holdings in Twombly and Iqbal, the Court 
deployed language that echoed industry rhetoric.  The Twombly order alluded 
to the alleged excessive costs of so-called frivolous litigation and blackmail 
settlements.  It stated that district courts must “insist upon some specificity in 
pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to 
proceed”133 and prevent plaintiffs from bringing “a largely groundless 
claim”134 intended to coerce an “in terrorem” settlement.135  Given that the 
defendant was the federal government, rather than a business, the order in 
Iqbal, signed by a bare majority of conservative justices, does not speak quite 
in the same register as Twombly.  Nevertheless, the Court based its reasoning, 
in part, on comparable logic that “litigation . . . exacts heavy costs in terms of 
efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might 
otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the 
Government.”136    
As several commentators have observed, the plausibility pleading 
standard introduced by Iqbal and Twombly is “nothing less than a 
‘revolutionary’ departure from notice pleading and from the original vision 
of the Federal Rules.”137  For many plaintiffs, the immediate practical effect 
of the new standard is to lower the probability of prevailing.  The plaintiffs 
most likely to lose at the motion-to-dismiss stage are those with claims 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
128 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
129 Id. at 1965.  
130 Id. at 1974. 
131 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.   
132 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
133 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558.  
134 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).     
135 Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).     
136 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685.   
137 Subrin & Main, supra note 98, at 1848 n.51 and accompanying text (2014) (collecting 
sources using similar language).  
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requiring information held by the defendant in order to be properly pled.138  
While neat empirical analyses have proven elusive,139 Iqbal and Twombly 
have likely deterred the filing of a meaningful proportion of meritorious 
cases and led to the premature dismissal of complaints—claims which likely 
would have proceeded to discovery under Conley.140  
 
B. Rise in Expected Costs: Summary Judgment 
 
The original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embraced jury trials as the 
norm but also established a method to dispose of suits by a judge before trial 
under Rule 56.  Summary judgment was previously considered, however, “an 
exceptional remedy with a very limited role.”141  Early cases involving 
summary judgment reflected the strong preference for trials, as illustrated by 
the Supreme Court’s 1962 pronouncement that summary judgment is 
permitted only “where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, where it is quite clear what the truth is, . . . [and where] no genuine issue 
remains for trial” since “the purpose of the rule is not to cut litigants off from 
their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try.”142  This reasoning 
was powerfully reinforced eight years later in the civil rights case of Adickes 
v. S.H. Kress & Co.143  The Supreme Court held that because a restaurant, 
which had allegedly colluded with police to discriminate on the basis of race, 
failed to proffer evidence that conclusively “foreclose[d] the possibility” of 
the plaintiff’s allegations, the dispute was inappropriate for resolution at 
summary judgment.144    
Adickes reigned supreme for sixteen years, but, as Judge Diane Wood put 
it, “then came the Revolution.”145  The Court reversed course and expanded 
the scope of summary judgment in a “trilogy” of decisions issued in 1986: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
138 Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two Doctrinal 
Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power Over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1217, 
1261–62 (2008). 
139 Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and 
Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270, 2287–94, 2338 (2012) (surveying the 
existing literature and eventually concluding, based on author’s own methodology, that the 
plausibility standard has had “substantial [negative] effects” for plaintiffs).    
140 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 20–22 (2010) (“The Court's signal was loud and clear. 
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class actions, and proceedings brought pro se.”).   
141 Subrin & Main, supra note 98, at 1851.   
142 Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Ark. 
Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 624 (1944)).   
143 398 U.S. 144, 156–57 (1970). 
144 Id. at 157–58. 
145 Hon. Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36 
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 231, 239 (2011). 
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Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,146 Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby,147 and Celotex Corp. v. Catrett.148  As summarized by Arthur 
Miller, “Celotex has made it easier to make the [summary judgment] motion, 
and Anderson and Matsushita have increased the chances that it will be 
granted.”149  The Court declared in Celotex that when the moving party does 
not carry the burden of proof at trial, the moving party could point to the 
non-moving party’s absence of evidence as evidence of absence, compelling 
summary judgment.150  Matsushita and Anderson give the judge leeway to 
effectively substitute his or her judgment for that of the jury.  Under 
Matsushita, the nonmoving party must come forward with persuasive 
evidence to support their claim that when the facts are presented by the 
moving party, they render the claim “implausible” to a “reasonable” jury.151  
Per Anderson, the nonmoving party must go beyond arguing that the jury 
may not believe the facts as presented by the moving party; rather, it must 
affirmatively present meaningful, contrary evidence.152   
The language and reasoning of the decisions also betrays the Court’s 
motivation, inspired by the received wisdom of industry, to address a 
perceived litigation explosion and the attendant financial costs for corporate 
defendants.  In Celotex, for example, Justice Rehnquist, in words that would 
have surely astonished the drafters of the Federal Rules, divined symmetry 
between a litigant’s constitutional right to present a full and fair case before a 
jury of her peers and a defendant’s purported “right” to obtain summary 
judgment.153   
Due in part to the trilogy, summary judgment has become the focal point 
of litigation—with jury trials having all but vanished from most civil dockets 
in federal court.  To illustrate, in 1938 about one out of five cases went to 
trial.154  By 2003, only about one in fifty cases went to trial.155  And while the 
absolute number of dispositions increased by five times from 1962 and 2000, 
the total number of trials decreased by one-fifth.156 
Contrary to the hopes implied in Celotex of reining in litigation costs, the 
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termination of disputes by a judge at summary judgment, rather than by a 
jury at trial, has likely increased the costs of litigation and had a 
disproportionately adverse impact on cash-strapped plaintiffs.157  Although 
“[t]he term ‘summary judgment’ suggests a judicial process that is simple, 
abbreviated, and inexpensive,” Judge D. Brock Hornby has written that “[it] 
is none of those.”158  The convoluted and costly nature of contemporary 
summary judgment practice emanates principally from the way the trilogy 
transformed discovery.  Previously, the limited purpose of discovery was to 
understand the nature of the claims and defenses of the opposing party to 
prepare for an actual trial.159  After the trilogy, litigants have used the 
discovery phase to amass as much evidence as possible to make, or 
surmount, a summary judgment motion and prepare for what amounts to a 
trial on the papers, with evidence culled from mountains of deposition 
transcripts, discovery responses, expert reports, and document productions.160  
Some may argue that trial is more expensive and complex than summary 
judgment, and therefore it is better that a large number of suits get disposed 
of at summary judgment.  There is, however, no factual basis for the 
underlying cost assumption.  Trial briefing is more straightforward, and 
appeals are less likely in light of appellate standards that accord deference to  
jury findings and judges’ trial rulings.161  
 
C. Rise in Expected Costs: Class Certification 
 
A class action is a suit maintained by an individual or group of 
individuals, “the named plaintiff(s),” on behalf of those who have suffered a 
common harm at the hands of a common culprit, or “the class.”162  The 
outcome of a class action binds all parties, which means that a class member 
cannot later bring a separate suit on the same claims litigated in the class 
action, regardless of the outcome.163  Hence, it is accurate to characterize the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
157 See Wood, supra note 145, at 233 (“[M]ore and more people are whispering that the 
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class action as a procedural mechanism that expands the scope of parties 
bound by a suit’s outcome.   
The original Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provided 
that lawsuits could be maintained as class actions, but set forth conceptually 
dense classifications that hampered their use.164  In 1966, Rule 23 was 
amended to clarify the nature of the rule and expand its availability.165  Most 
important was the new Rule 23(b)(3), which replaced the existing opt-in 
mechanism with an opt-out mechanism for participation in class suits by 
absent class members.166   
For a suit to be maintained as a class action, the criteria elaborated in 
Rule 23(a)—commonality, numerosity, typicality and adequacy—must be 
met, along with the criteria for one of the categories of suits set forth in Rule 
23(b).167  In recent years, courts have imposed onerous, new requirements for 
suits to obtain class action status, substantially raising the costs of 
litigating.168  A core rationale—openly stated—for the new requirements has 
been the perception, eagerly cultivated by industry, that class action suits are 
abusive and blackmail defendants into settling.169 
Arguably the most dramatic shift in class action jurisprudence has been 
from requiring the elements of class certification to be shown principally 
through the nature of the pleadings to demanding that each element be 
supported by a preponderance of the evidence.170  In 1982, the Supreme 
Court wrote that class certification is proper only if “the trial court is 
satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23 are 
met.”171  In recent years, courts’ constriction of class action practice has 
largely developed around the subordinate clause “after a rigorous 
analysis.”172  This shift, ushered in by some courts of appeals in the 2000s 
and later blessed by the Supreme Court, was doctrinally justified as part of 
the court’s duty to conduct a “rigorous analysis.”173  As a result, successful 
class certification motions today generally come only after extensive 
discovery, well-refined expert testimony, and lengthy evidentiary hearings 
dedicated solely to class certification, none of which were envisioned by the 
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167 Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 398 (2010); see 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.  
168 Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U.L. REV. 729, 731 (2013); 
Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T 
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original Federal Rules, or the 1966 amendments. 174    
In a seminal case that applied rigorous, costly class certification criteria, 
In re Hydrogen Peroxide, the Third Circuit justified the new regime by 
noting that class certification “create[s] unwarranted pressure to settle non-
meritorious claims on the part of defendants” and that this “potential for 
unwarranted settlement pressure is a factor we weigh in our certification 
calculus.”175  The Third Circuit is not alone in reasoning from a premise 
patterned on unsubstantiated corporate messaging, as almost every circuit has 
imposed the same criteria based on the same reasoning.176   
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes177 and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 178 
the Supreme Court also endorsed this shift.  In Dukes, the Court found that 
the commonality requirement demands that the plaintiff present a common 
contention of such a nature that “determination of its truth or falsity will 
resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one 
stroke.”179  Mere pleadings, however, cannot satisfy commonality, or other 
Rule 23(a) requirements, as a plaintiff must “affirmatively demonstrate his 
compliance” through evidence.180  In Comcast, the Court found that “the 
same analytical principles govern Rule 23(b),” and that “[i]f anything, Rule 
23(b)(3)’s predominance criterion is even more demanding than Rule 
23(a).”181  Because the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement also calls 
for an examination of the elements of the claims that plaintiff seeks to have 
certified, some lower courts have applied Comcast in a manner that compels 
exhaustive matching of evidence with claims’ elements to demonstrate that 
common issues, in fact, prevail over individual ones for each claim.182  
The transition from reliance on pleadings to a preponderance of the 
evidence for each element of class certification has substantially raised the 
costs of class litigation for plaintiffs, who carry the burden for proving that 
the suit should be maintained on a class basis.183  The necessary evidence for 
each element is typically in the possession of the defendant, demanding 
intensive discovery that defendants resist at every turn.184  Further, well-
heeled defendants are likely to hire experts to construe the available evidence 
in a manner that suggests that plaintiffs have not affirmatively identified 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
174 See generally Klonoff, supra note 168, at 745–92.  
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enough parties, shown that resolution of common issues will drive the 
litigation and predominate over individual issues, and shown that the class 
action is a superior method for resolving disputes over individual litigation.  
Accordingly, plaintiffs are compelled to hire their own expert(s) to show that 
they have, in fact, met these criteria.  In an additional, recent requirement, 
plaintiffs’ experts are also subject to motions challenging their qualifications, 
methodology and conclusions185 under the standard articulated in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,186 which was intended merely as a 
method of protecting juries, not judges, from unsound expert evidence.187  
 
D. Lowered Expected Value: The Ascertainability Prerequisite for Class 
Certification 
 
Most of the new requirements of class certification have made the 
process more expensive—sometimes exceedingly so—but have not 
altogether eliminated the possibility of class actions.  Some new procedural 
requirements, though, could have this effect.  For example, the imposition of 
a strict ascertainability requirement demands that plaintiffs be able to readily 
ascertain class membership through objective criteria at the class certification 
stage.  While reasonable sounding on its face, ascertainability may be very 
difficult to satisfy in cases implicating inexpensive non-durable goods for 
which consumers rarely keep proof of purchase.  Strict ascertainability, if 
widely adopted, threatens to end most consumer class actions involving a 
low-priced consumer good.188  Ascertainability is not found in Rule 23 but 
courts have recently deemed it to be an “implicit” requirement that flows 
from a perceived need to determine the identities of those who would be 
bound by judgment.189   
A 2013 Third Circuit decision, Carrera v. Bayer Corp., uses perhaps the 
most stringent version of ascertainability to raise hurdles, often 
insurmountable, for plaintiffs.190  Largely relying on precedent of his own 
making, Judge Scirica, writing for the panel, observed that a “rigorous 
analysis” of class action requirements demands that plaintiffs be able to show 
at the class certification stage that the members of the putative class are 
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“currently and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria.”191  The court 
held that a putative class of purchasers of an allegedly ineffectual weight loss 
supplement, costing approximately fifteen dollars per package, was not 
ascertainable.192  The court reasoned that no objective criteria existed to 
determine class members because consumers were unlikely to retain proof of 
purchase, only some retailers retained records of sales to individuals, and the 
submission of affidavits to show proof of purchase purportedly invited 
fraudulent claims.193 
Strict ascertainability requirements have been premised on protecting 
supposedly vulnerable corporate defendants.  In Carrera, the Third Circuit 
justified its rigorous ascertainability requirement on an alleged “due process 
right” of corporate defendants “to challenge the proof used to demonstrate 
class membership.”194  In civil rights litigation, plaintiffs are routinely 
instructed that a procedural due process violation must be tethered to “the 
deprivation of interests encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
protection of liberty and property,”195 whereas the corporate defendant in 
Carrera was not.  Had the court applied this well-established standard in 
Carrerra, it should have found that the total damages are ascertainable 
through the defendant’s sales records.  The defendant’s due process right, if 
any, should only entitle it to pay out no more than that amount in 
compensatory damages, not dictate the distribution of this money.196  Even if 
the defendant did have such a due process right, however, that right is to be 
weighed, as it is in the civil rights context, against competing interests, 
including the values served by class actions and private enforcement more 
generally.197  
 
E. Lowered Expected Value: Bilateral Arbitration 
 
Judicial compulsion of lawsuits to arbitration, and enforcement of class 
action waivers, has also dramatically reduced the expected value of filing 
suit.  Arbitration is a form of extrajudicial dispute resolution in which an 
ostensibly neutral actor resolves disputes in an informal setting lacking many 
procedural protections found in courts.  This enables a speedier, but arguably 
less just, resolution.  In addition, present-day arbitration clauses contain class 
action waivers, which courts have enforced, that prevent individuals from 
participating in class actions and other aggregate suits.198    
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In the early 20th century, arbitration gained favor as an efficient method 
of resolving business-to-business disputes, with the Federal Arbitration Act 
of 1925 (“FAA”) abrogating judicial barriers to contractual arbitration.  The 
text of the FAA features two seemingly inconsistent provisions.199  The FAA 
declared arbitration clauses presumptively “valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable.”200  This apparently broad grant of authority existed alongside 
an equally broad restriction contained in the FAA’s savings clause, which 
exempted from the statute’s purview grounds that “exist at law or in equity 
for the revocation of any contract.”201   
The FAA had only modest effects early in its lifespan.  The statute’s 
legislative history shows that Congress intended the statute to be procedural 
in nature202 and to facilitate enforcement of business-to-business arbitration 
agreements for claims brought in federal court—and only in federal court.203  
The statute was not to apply in state court and was not intended to preempt 
state law.204  This understanding was so fundamental that even litigants did 
not bother attempting to unsettle it.205  In addition, the savings clause 
preserved cases implicating important rights as “judges denied motions to 
compel arbitration of antitrust, securities, pension, and patent disputes, and 
refused to grant preclusive effect to arbitrators’ rulings on claims under civil 
rights statutes.”206 
The sea change began in the 1980s and coincided with the growth of 
industry’s efforts against private enforcement.207  Southland v. Keating, an 
early and significant decision, held that the FAA applies in state court and 
preempts conflicting state law.208  In the next term, the Court held that the 
FAA could also bar adjudication of federal statutory rights in a court of 
law.209  Previously, the Court had drawn a clear distinction between 
contractual and statutory claims with the latter protected from compulsion to 
arbitration.210  In Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 
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Inc.,211 however, the Court, channeling the ascendant industry-driven 
narrative of a litigation explosion, announced that there is no comparative 
benefit to a “day in court” over a day in an arbitral conference room.212  
Accordingly, the Court ruled the antitrust claim before it should be moved to 
arbitration.213   
The Court, however, stressed that its ruling was limited because a 
showing of “overwhelming economic power” could still provide grounds for 
the revocation of an arbitration clause214 and the propriety of arbitration still 
rested on the ability of a litigant to effectively vindicate its statutory rights in 
arbitration.215   
While these limitations on arbitration provided some solace to plaintiffs, 
they, too, were eliminated by the Court in the 2000s.  The final victories of 
arbitration were driven by private industry.  In the mid-to-late 1990s, a for-
profit arbitration outfit instructed its corporate clientele in marketing 
materials that the best way to fortify its defenses against class action liability 
was to include arbitration clauses with class action waivers in its form 
contracts with consumers.216  Many corporations ran with this advice.217  
Courts now routinely enforce arbitration clauses and class action waivers, 
which are increasingly ubiquitous.  In 2010, the Supreme Court went so far 
as to prevent arbitrators from ordering class-wide arbitration unless an 
arbitration agreement expressly permits class proceedings, making class 
action waivers the default.218   
In the past five years, two decisions have eviscerated the potential 
limitations on arbitration’s scope as outlined in Mitsubishi Motors.  First, the 
notion that “overwhelming economic power” could act as a limit on 
arbitration was effectively abandoned in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion.219  In 
Concepcion, plaintiff consumers initiated a putative class action lawsuit 
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against a cell phone company, alleging that the company induced them to 
enter into contracts by offering a free phone, but subsequently charged the 
consumers $30.22 to cover sales taxes.220  The contract contained an 
arbitration clause with a class-action waiver that required plaintiffs to 
proceed in arbitration only on a bilateral basis with the company, rather than 
on behalf of all consumers who had been similarly defrauded.221  Under 
governing California law, the district court and the Ninth Circuit held that 
adhesion contracts of this kind were considered unconscionable because they 
enabled those with overwhelming economic power to “deliberately cheat 
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money[.]”222  
No rational consumer would bring an individual claim for such paltry 
damages.223  
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit decision, invoking 
business victimhood mythology.  The Court held that the California law 
barring class action waivers in adhesion contracts as unconscionable was an 
impermissible “obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives,” 
and therefore, was preempted.224  The Court brushed aside concerns that the 
absence of a class mechanism would mean that small-value claims would go 
unprosecuted.225  It reasoned that this was “unrelated” to the preemption 
inquiry and that, in any event, class-wide proceedings are unfair to corporate 
defendants as they result in “in terrorem” settlements with the sheer size of 
class proceedings compelling defendants to settle “questionable claims.”226  
In practice, Concepcion gutted the FAA’s savings clause.  Lower courts now 
have little room to find an arbitration clause unconscionable; doing so would 
have to be squared with the Court’s order that state law must not “stand as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”227      
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest.,228 the Court eliminated 
the one last refuge for prospective plaintiffs—that arbitration must allow a 
plaintiff to effectively vindicate his or her statutory rights.  While 
Concepcion involved preemption of state law claims, Italian Colors 
implicated claims arising under federal antitrust law.  The plaintiff restaurant, 
Italian Colors, alleged that American Express had unlawfully leveraged its 
monopoly power in charge cards to force merchants to accept its high-cost 
credit cards.229  While the parties’ contract contained an arbitration clause, 
the plaintiff argued that the dispute was not subject to arbitration because 
compulsion to arbitral forum would prevent the plaintiff from vindicating its 
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federal statutory rights.230  In its opposition to the defendant’s motion to 
compel arbitration, the plaintiff submitted a declaration from an economist 
estimating that the costs of proving plaintiff’s claim would be “at least 
several hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,” while the 
maximum recovery would be only $38,549.231   
The Court held that the purported “effective vindication” exception was 
mere dictum in Mitsubishi Motors, on which the Court subsequently declined 
to rely on to invalidate arbitration agreements, and the same result was 
necessary in the case before it as “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an 
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim.”232  In reaching 
its conclusion, the Court relied on the broad language extolling the virtues of 
arbitration in Concepcion that purportedly are embodied in the FAA.233  
Justice Kagan, authoring a dissent for three justices, called the decision a 
“betrayal of our precedents, and of federal statutes like the antitrust laws,”234 
adding that: “In the hands of today’s majority, arbitration threatens to 
become . . . a mechanism easily made to block the vindication of meritorious 
federal claims and insulate wrongdoers from liability.”235   
Today, when a large number of potential plaintiffs have been commonly 
defrauded by comparatively small amounts, the pursuit of private 
enforcement is usually futile with the presence of a bilateral arbitration 
clause.  In light of the expected benefits, the costs of individual arbitrations 
are prohibitive.236  The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s study on the 
effects of arbitration clauses in consumer financial contracts confirms this 
economic logic.  Across six major consumer finance markets in which tens of 
millions of Americans participate, the CFPB reported that in 2010 and 2011 
only fifty-two individual arbitration claims for less than $1,000 were filed 
and that just four of these claimants obtained relief.237  It is unsurprising that 
large civil defense firms specify the “potential elimination” of mass 
accountability as the principal benefit of arbitration for their corporate 
clients.238    
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IV. THE EUROPEAN UNION HAS SOUGHT TO DEVELOP PRIVATE 
ENFORCEMENT, BUT DEFERENCE TO U.S. INDUSTRY RHETORIC HAS IMPEDED 
REAL CHANGE 
 
While the Supreme Court has subverted private rights of action in the 
United States, European Union institutions have taken a number of steps over 
the past fifteen years to develop the private enforcement of public law, with 
an emphasis on antitrust law.239  Traditionally, the European Union and its 
Member States placed public institutions at the center of their law 
enforcement regimes.240  Private enforcement has been underdeveloped and 
largely existed as an afterthought.  Breaking with this historical norm, the 
European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), in a series of decisions since 2001, has 
held that victims of antitrust violations have a right to seek damages and also 
lowered procedural obstacles to private antitrust suits.241  In contrast to its 
American counterpart’s hostility toward private rights of action across all 
areas of law, the European Union’s highest court has aimed to encourage 
private enforcement in antitrust in particular. 
The European Union has enacted rules to effectuate private rights of 
action. Seeking to protect public rights broadly, the European Commission 
(“EC”) issued a non-binding recommendation in June 2013 on collective 
actions applicable to areas such as antitrust, consumer protection, and 
financial services.242  Building on the ECJ’s more narrowly-focused rulings, 
the European Council enacted a binding directive on private antitrust 
enforcement in November 2014.243  This directive establishes a basic 
procedural framework for facilitating antitrust damages actions. European 
Union Member States were given two years to establish these enumerated 
rules as national law.244 While the antitrust-specific directive includes a 
number of positive elements, the more general recommendation has two 
critical deficiencies—opt-in collective actions and restrictions on third-party 
financing—that are almost guaranteed to yield inadequate private 
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enforcement.  
In developing its recommendation, the EC credited the tort reform 
narrative in the United States and repeatedly stated the need to prevent 
“abusive litigation” in Europe.245  Yet, this concern is based on a false 
portrayal of the civil justice process in the United States. The so-called 
excesses do not reflect reality and are the product of a distorted historical 
record.  
 
A. The European Court of Justice Recognizes and Promotes Private 
Rights of Action, in Particular in Antitrust Law 
 
Although European countries have relied extensively on government 
action to protect citizens, European Union law has long formally recognized 
private rights of action as well.  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union states that “everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed 
by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy.”246  
In a 1963 decision, the ECJ held that an article of the EU’s foundational 
treaty “must be interpreted as producing direct effects and creating individual 
rights which national courts must protect.”247  From a policy perspective, the 
ECJ has stated that private rights of action complement public enforcement 
and deter illegal conduct.248  In a series of decisions starting in 2001, the ECJ 
articulated principles governing antitrust private damages actions in the 
national courts of the Member States.  These decisions catalyzed an 
appreciable shift in the approach of the European Union to private 
enforcement more generally. 
In its 2001 decision in Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, the ECJ held that the 
victims of antitrust violations have a right to pursue actions for damages.249  
Crehan was the owner of a pub in the United Kingdom.250  As part of his 
lease, he was required to serve only beer produced by Courage.251  After he 
was sued for violating this term of the lease, Crehan filed a counterclaim for 
damages in English court.252  He alleged that the tying arrangement that 
required him to serve only Courage’s beer as a condition of his lease was a 
violation of European antitrust law and hurt the profitability of his 
business.253  In deciding several questions of European Union law referred to 
it by the English High Court, the ECJ held that Crehan had a right to obtain 
damages if he could establish an antitrust violation and show that the 
violation caused the damages he suffered.254  It stated that EU law created 
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rights for individuals and that the national courts “must ensure that those 
rules take full effect and must protect the rights which they confer on 
individuals.”255  The ECJ also observed that a failure to permit private 
enforcement would undermine “the full effectiveness” of European antitrust 
law.256  According to the ECJ, damages actions play an important deterrence 
role and “can make a significant contribution to the maintenance of effective 
competition in the [European] Community.”257 
The ECJ’s next major pronouncement on private rights of action under 
antitrust law was in Manfredi v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicurazioni SpA.258  The 
Italian competition authority had found that the defendant insurance 
companies had engaged in illegal information sharing as a means of fixing 
rates on domestic auto insurance policies.259  The claimants filed suit seeking 
to recover damages for the overcharges arising from this conspiracy.260  In 
affirming the importance of private enforcement, the ECJ recited the 
compensation and deterrence benefits from Crehan.261  Importantly, it ruled 
that private parties could rely on findings of antitrust violations by the 
national and European competition authorities in pursuing their claims.262  In 
other words, these decisions would have preclusive effect, and private parties 
would only have to establish a causal connection between the violation and 
their injuries.  In addition, the court held that parties can seek damages for 
both overcharges and lost profits.263  While Manfredi did not endorse 
exemplary or punitive damages, it did not foreclose this option either.264 
Although they enshrined private rights of action in EU law, the Crehan 
and Manfredi decisions left the implementation of private enforcement to the 
European Union Member States.  Manfredi stated that “[i]t is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to designate the courts and 
tribunals having jurisdiction to hear actions for damages based on an 
infringement of the Community competition rules and to prescribe the 
detailed procedural rules governing those actions[.]”265  This discretion is 
subject to two important limitations.  First, the procedures cannot be less 
favorable for actions under EU law than they are for similar actions under 
national law—or the principle of equivalence.266  Second, the procedures 
cannot “render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of 
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the right to seek compensation”—or the principle of effectiveness.267 
In recent years, the ECJ has articulated additional principles that 
encourage private antitrust enforcement.  In Europese Gemeenschap v. Otis 
NV, it affirmed that national courts must treat the EC’s antitrust decisions as 
binding and cannot issue conflicting decisions.268  And it has also broadened 
the scope of damages that claimants can recover.269  
 
B. The European Commission Has Taken an Important Step Toward 
Developing Effective Private Antitrust Enforcement 
 
In November 2014, the European Council enacted a directive that 
establishes a basic framework for the private enforcement of European 
antitrust law.270  The directive sets out procedural rules that Member States 
must incorporate into national law within two years.271  Through this 
directive, the EC has laid significant, albeit imperfect, building blocks for an 
effective system of private antitrust litigation. 
 
1. Procedural Requirements for Private Antitrust Enforcement in the 
EU Member States 
 
The directive lays out a discovery process.  It establishes the right of 
claimants to obtain evidence from defendants and third parties.272  Courts 
should order defendants and third parties to disclose relevant evidence 
provided that a claimant has “a reasoned justification containing reasonably 
available facts and evidence to support the plausibility of its claim for 
damages.”273  The disclosure obligation is subject to a proportionality test.274  
If defendants fail to comply or destroy relevant evidence, the directive 
requires courts to impose penalties, including applying legal presumptions in 
favor of the claimant and ordering the payment of legal costs.275 
The directive confers binding authority on the decisions of national 
competition authorities and sets out a long statute of limitations period.  If a 
national competition authority finds a violation of antitrust law, courts in that 
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jurisdiction are directed to hold that a violation has been “irrefutably 
established for the purposes for an action for damages.”276  With respect to 
decisions in other Member States, courts should accord them a high degree of 
deference and apply them “as at least prima facie evidence that an 
infringement of antitrust law has occurred.”277  The directive requires 
Member States to establish a limitations period of no less than five years that 
does not begin to run until a claimant “knows, or can reasonably be expected 
to know” that an infringement has occurred and caused him or her harm. 278 
Defendants are also subject to joint and several liability.  A defendant in 
an antitrust action is liable for the entire harm arising from the alleged 
violation, including the harm inflicted by other participants in the illegal 
activity.279  For damages above and beyond those attributed to its conduct, a 
defendant can seek compensation from its co-conspirators.280  Antitrust 
violators that have received leniency from a competition authority for 
reporting cartel conduct are immune from joint and several liability.281 
On the question of passing-on of overcharges from illegal conduct, the 
European Union has parted ways with federal law in the United States.  All 
purchasers—regardless of whether they purchased directly from the antitrust 
violator or an intermediary—are entitled to seek damages.282  This indirect 
purchaser standing distinguishes European law from federal law in the 
United States, where the Supreme Court has held that the antitrust laws grant 
consumer standing only to direct purchasers.283  At the same time, defendants 
can invoke the passing-on of illegal overcharges as a defense against direct 
purchasers;284 this is also contrary to federal precedent in the United States, 
which prohibits this defense.285  A defendant in Europe is entitled to a 
commensurate reduction in damages to direct purchasers if it shows that the 
overcharge was passed through to downstream customers in the form of 
higher prices.286 
The directive provides some guidance on damages.287  It restricts 
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Member States from establishing legal standards for damages that makes 
damages actions “practically impossible or excessively difficult.”288  In the 
context of cartel conduct, a presumption of harm is automatically 
established.289  But for other antitrust claims, no such presumption exists. 
 
2. A Positive, But Imperfect, Enactment 
 
The directive is an important step forward and represents real progress 
toward creating effective private antitrust enforcement.  Several provisions 
raise the expected benefits and reduce the costs of litigation.  They increase 
the likelihood that ordinary citizens will be able to vindicate their economic 
rights in court.  Nonetheless, it has a notable weakness that could hurt private 
actions and diminish the deterrence of anticompetitive behavior. 
Two articles of the directive raise the expected benefits from a private 
antitrust claim.  Article 11 establishes joint and several liability for antitrust 
violations.290  Per this provision, a claimant “has the right to require full 
compensation from any [defendant] until he has been fully compensated.”291  
By allowing a claimant to recover its entire damage from a single defendant, 
joint and several liability raises the expected benefits from a single lawsuit.  
Without joint and several liability, a plaintiff is permitted to recover only the 
damages specifically attributed to each defendant. 
Article 12 confers standing on all consumers—those who purchased the 
affected products directly and indirectly from the antitrust violators.292  By 
granting standing to indirect purchasers, the directive permits them to recover 
damages for the overcharges they had to bear because of upstream antitrust 
law infringements.293  In the absence of this rule, indirect purchasers would 
not have standing to recover and would have an expected benefit of zero 
from antitrust litigation.  In the United States, for example, federal antitrust 
law denies standing to indirect purchasers.  The Illinois Brick rule holds that 
only direct purchasers have the right to pursue consumer antitrust claims.294  
This narrower standing rule not only reduces the expected benefits for 
indirect purchasers—it eliminates them entirely. 
The directive has multiple provisions that reduce the costs of uncovering 
antitrust law violations.  Article 5 provides for proportionate discovery if a 
claimant presents “a reasoned justification containing reasonably available 
facts and evidence sufficient to support the plausibility of its claim for 
damages.”295  Provided these conditions are met, national courts must order 
“the defendant or a third party to disclose relevant evidence which lies in 
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their control.”296  Article 10 establishes a minimum limitation period of five 
years.297  And the limitation period does not begin until the plaintiff knows or 
reasonably could know that a violation of antitrust law has occurred, that this 
violation has caused harm to the plaintiff, and the identity of the violator.298  
These two provisions reduce the costs of investigation for claimants.  
Plaintiffs are not expected to undertake extraordinary pre-trial investigations 
on their own to uncover violations, nor are they required to uncover 
violations in an unreasonably short period of time. 
Plaintiffs face lower litigation costs under the directive’s rules of issue 
preclusion.  If a national competition authority decision has found an 
antitrust violation, courts in that country are required to hold that a violation 
has been “irrefutably established for the purposes for an action for 
damages.”299  And courts in other EU nations are required to treat this 
decision “as at least prima facie evidence that a violation of antitrust law has 
occurred.”300  These two rules relieve plaintiffs of the burden of relitigating 
and proving allegations that the public authorities have already found to be 
true.  And Article 17 establishes a presumption of harm from collusion.301  
Consequently, plaintiffs in cartel cases do not have to show that they suffered 
harm from this illegal conduct. 
At the same time, the directive has a notable weakness.  While all injured 
parties (whether they are direct or indirect purchasers) are granted standing, 
defendants are entitled to invoke the passing-on defense to damages.302  
Intermediate buyers when forced to pay overcharges on products due to 
cartelistic or other anticompetitive behavior can sometimes pass these higher 
prices, in large measure, on to customers. With the availability of a passing-
on defense, defendants can reduce their damages to direct purchasers to the 
extent that direct purchasers passed the illegal overcharges through to their 
customers.303  The passing-on defense can harm the compensation and 
deterrence function of private enforcement.304  Because it reduces damages to 
direct purchasers, this defense lowers their anticipated recovery (the expected 
benefit from legal action), making a lawsuit less attractive and harming 
overall deterrence.  The U.S. experience suggests that indirect purchasers 
cannot be expected to carry a significant part of the enforcement burden and 
fully offset reduced enforcement by direct purchasers.  In most EU nations, 
this deficiency is compounded by the procedural obstacles to collective 
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C. Notwithstanding the Progress Embodied in the Directive, the 
Recommendation on Collective Actions Has Significant, Arguably Fatal, 
Deficiencies 
 
In June 2013, the European Commission issued a non-binding 
recommendation on collective actions that Member States should enact into 
law.306 This statement sets out basic procedures for group litigation.  In 
contrast to the many strengths of the directive, the recommendation imposes 
significant burdens on class actions and will likely ensure that they are 
pursued infrequently, if at all.  
 
1. “Best Practices” for Group Litigation of Antitrust and Other 
Claims 
 
The EC’s recommendation is non-binding and only states that Member 
States “should” enact them into national law within two years.307  It presents 
model procedural rules for all the important questions that govern a system 
of collective private rights of action, including the availability, operation, and 
funding of group litigation mechanisms.  Like the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure in the United States, these rules are trans-substantive and intended 
to cover a number of areas of law.308 
The recommendation confers standing on both natural persons and 
“qualified entities.”309  Qualified entities should be designated by Member 
States to bring actions on behalf of individuals.310  They should be non-profit 
in character, work on matters related to the alleged legal violation, and have 
the capacity to represent multiple injured parties.311  To facilitate collective 
litigation against illegal conduct that has effects in multiple Member States, 
national rules should not discriminate against litigants, including qualified 
organizations, from other EU nations.312 
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In a nod to the class certification process in the United States, the EC 
calls for an admissibility procedure.313  Courts in the Member States should 
examine proposed collective actions for their suitability for litigation on a 
group basis.314  Cases in which “conditions for collective actions are not met” 
or “manifestly unfounded cases” should be terminated.315 
Opt-in actions are established as the norm for collective litigation.  
Parties should be required to affirm expressly that they consent to 
representation by the named litigant.316  They should be permitted to join or 
leave the action at “any time before the judgment is given or the case is 
otherwise validly settled.”317  Because opt-in actions are set out as the 
presumptive rule, any exception “should be duly justified by reasons or 
sound administration of justice.”318  To facilitate opt-in actions, the 
recommendation states that Member States should allow for the broad 
dissemination of information concerning the alleged legal violation and the 
proposed collective litigation.319   
The recommendation has several provisions for litigation funding and 
endorses a number of restrictions in this area.  Litigants are obligated to 
disclose the source of their funding at the beginning of proceedings.320  
Courts should stay the case if a third-party funder has a conflict of interest 
with the claimant, or cannot meet its financial obligations to the claimant, or 
if the claimant cannot cover the costs of the opposing party in the event of an 
adverse outcome.321  The recommendation bars contingency fee 
arrangements with attorneys under ordinary circumstances.322  Contingency 
fee arrangements with third parties are also prohibited unless they are subject 
to government oversight.323  And these parties are not allowed to influence 
the plaintiff’s litigation strategy.324  The “loser-pays” rule in litigation is 
endorsed, which, as the name suggests, means the losing party covers the 
costs of the winning party.325   
The recommendation prohibits punitive and other non-compensatory 
damages.  Damages should be limited to the actual harm suffered by the 
group members.326  This restriction is justified on the basis of avoiding 
“overcompensation in favor of the claimant party.”327 
The Member States are directed to encourage settlement and alternative 
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dispute resolution.328  Settlement should be promoted before and during the 
trial.329  Member States should also encourage collective alternative dispute 
settlement mechanisms based on the parties’ consent.330 
 
2. The Recommendation Lays Out Model Procedural Rules That 
Frustrate Collective Litigation 
 
While the directive is an important step forward, the recommendation 
promotes counterproductive mechanisms for collective litigation in antitrust 
and other areas of law.  It endorses opt-in mechanisms for group actions and 
restricts the means of funding these litigations.  As a result, unless the 
Member States enact provisions that contradict the principles of the EC’s 
recommendation, private rights of action are likely to remain a dead letter for 
ordinary Europeans. 
  
a. Strong Presumption in Favor of Opt-In and Against Opt-Out 
Collective Actions 
 
The recommendation perpetuates the status quo of ineffective private 
enforcement.  Because opt-in actions do not permit the efficient 
consolidation of a large number of small claims, they reduce the expected 
benefits from litigation.  Accordingly, the opt-in requirement discourages the 
filing of claims on behalf of a large number of injured parties.  Consumers 
and small businesses typically have small, or even negative, value legal 
claims.  For them, the continued reliance on opt-in mechanisms means that 
the rights recognized by the European Court of Justice in Crehan and 
Manfredi will be difficult to vindicate.  Opt-in mechanisms are ineffective in 
providing redress for injured parties and also deterring illegal behavior. 
The choice between opt-in and opt-out actions has proven to be critical 
around the world.  Opt-in actions place the onus on individuals to participate.  
Individuals must either file their own action before they are consolidated into 
a group action or take an affirmative decision to join an already initiated 
collective action.331  In contrast, under opt-out actions, the class of injured 
parties is broadly defined332—for example, all New Yorkers who purchased 
butter between January 1, 2000 and January 1, 2005.  Parties that do not opt 
out are bound by any final judgment or settlement.333 
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Opt-in actions have had a disappointing record in practice.  In most 
European jurisdictions that presently provide for group litigation, opt-in 
actions are the principal form of collective redress mechanism.334  For the 
most part, opt-in rates have been low,335 rendering the legal action 
uneconomical.  Individuals have failed to opt-in for a number of reasons.  
These include unfamiliarity with the case, lack of interest in vindicating a 
small claim, inertia, distrust of the legal process, and fear of affiliation with 
litigation perceived as controversial.336  An analysis of thirty-seven group 
litigations in England found that thirty-two cases had an opt-in rate below 
fifty percent, and eight cases had a rate below one percent.337  Of course, opt-
in rates have not been universally low.  Some actions involving a large 
number of potential members have witnessed opt-in rates as high as ninety 
percent.338  Higher opt-in records have been seen in employment litigation,339 
in which individual damages are often quite large.  Even in this area, 
however, low opt-in rates are the norm.  In the United States, the Fair Labor 
Standards Act deviates from the opt-out norm and expressly requires opt-in 
class actions.340  Opt-in rates have typically been low, weakening the 
enforcement of federal wage-and-hour law.341 
A representative action brought by the British consumer organization 
Which? illustrates the shortcomings of opt-in class actions.  The Office of 
Fair Trading (“OFT”) had found that JJB Sports, a leading sports retailer in 
the UK, had coerced Umbro, a maker of sporting gear, into imposing resale 
price maintenance on the England national team and Manchester United 
jerseys in the months leading up to the Euro 2000 soccer tournament.342  
Resale price maintenance prohibited retailers from discounting these jerseys 
and forced consumers to pay higher prices than they would have in a 
competitive market.343  English law permits qualified entities to bring follow-
on actions in antitrust matters in the Competition Appeal Tribunal.344  
Following the OFT’s decision, Which? brought a follow-on action in the 
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Competition Appeal Tribunal, seeking damages on behalf of British 
consumers who had purchased English national or Manchester United jerseys 
in 2000.345 
The results of the follow-on action were disappointing.  Up to a million 
people may have purchased jerseys subject to the illegal price maintenance 
scheme.346  Because UK law at the time provided only for opt-in actions, 
Which? had to solicit consumers to join the litigation.347  Despite an 
aggressive publicity campaign,348 the action attracted just 130 participants,349 
an opt-in rate of below one percent.350  Which? incurred significant legal 
costs in this unsuccessful effort,351 raising serious doubts as to whether it 
would pursue a follow-on antitrust action again so long as the opt-in rule 
remained in effect.352 
Low opt-in rates are troubling on multiple grounds.  First, if many parties 
are failing to participate due to a lack of knowledge or interest, private rights 
of action fail to fulfill their compensatory function.  On net, injured parties 
are uncompensated for the harms that they have suffered.  In many cases, the 
individual damages may be small so the lost compensation could be 
dismissed as a minor concern.  Private enforcement, however, serves an 
important role in deterring illegal conduct—a role arguably more important 
than its compensatory one.  The European Court of Justice has recognized 
that private damages actions can protect competitive markets.353  When opt-
in rates are low, lawbreakers are allowed to keep their ill-gotten gains.  
In sharp contrast to opt-in collective actions, opt-out collective actions 
typically see high participation rates.  Just as few people choose to opt in to 
litigation, very few choose to opt out of them.  In addition to the United 
States, other nations with opt-out actions include Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, and Portugal.354  The Netherlands has an opt-out settlement 
procedure but no opt-out collective actions.355  An empirical study of opt-out 
litigation under federal law in the United States and in the Australian state of 
Victoria has found median opt-out rates of 0.2 percent and 13 percent, 
respectively.356  Opt-out rates have been comparably low in the Netherlands 
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and Portugal.357  In other words, the overwhelming majority of affected 
individuals generally take no action and remain passive members of opt-out 
group litigation.358 
Opt-out actions help spread the costs of litigation among a large pool of 
plaintiffs.  On an individual basis, consumer claims often have a small or 
even negative value—the costs of litigation exceed the expected recovery.  
As a result, claim consolidation is essential for the vindication of many 
consumer rights.359  From a benefit-cost perspective, opt-out actions raise the 
expected benefits of litigation because they combine thousands—sometimes 
even millions—of small claims into a single action.  Since a sizable fraction 
of litigation costs are fixed or do not increase in lockstep with the number of 
class members, an opt-out mechanism can convert countless small or 
negative value claims into a single attractive claim.360  In contrast, opt-in 
actions ordinarily attract far fewer participants and do not permit the 
effective consolidation of individual legal claims. 
Furthermore, opt-out class actions promote judicial efficiency and legal 
certainty for defendants.  By sweeping a large number of individual claims 
into a single action, opt-out litigation greatly reduces the number of parallel 
actions in court.361  And this consolidation of numerous individual claims 
also offers legal comfort to defendants.  Once an opt-out action has been 
resolved, defendants can identify the maximum number of future individual 
claims based on the number of parties that opted out.362  And, as indicated 
earlier, opt-out rates tend to be very low. 
 
b. Restrictions on Third-Party Funding and Support for the Loser-Pays 
Rule 
 
Through its onerous restrictions on litigation funding, the EC’s 
recommendation starves collective actions of the necessary resources.  It 
prohibits contingency fee arrangements between clients and lawyers and also 
heavily restricts contingency fee agreements with third parties.  The lack of a 
funding provision combined with the backdrop of two-way fee shifting 
renders group litigation much less feasible. 
Given that litigation, especially collective litigation, entails significant 
upfront expenditures,363 funding is critical to plaintiffs.  In most instances, 
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ordinary consumers will be either unable or unwilling to foot the bill of 
litigation.  And qualified entities, barring extraordinary public support, are 
not likely to have the necessary means either.364  In an opt-in environment, 
the possibility of having to cover the costs of litigation will only further drive 
down the already low participation rates.  For consumers, a lack of financing 
will, in practice, mean that few, if any, claims are brought on their behalf. 
Modern antitrust cases, for example, are costly for a number of reasons.  
For one, they often involve analysis of complicated economic questions on 
whether the defendant’s conduct was, on net, harmful to competition and 
consumers.  As private antitrust litigation in the United States has shown, 
these cases entail extensive discovery and also the retention of business and 
economic experts.365  And even in follow-on actions in which a national 
competition authority has already found a violation, claimants are 
responsible for quantifying damages. 
The bar on contingency fee arrangements between clients and lawyers 
deprives collective actions of an obvious source of funding.  Unlike ordinary 
consumers, enterprising lawyers are willing to cover the upfront costs of 
litigation.366  In exchange for a percentage of any final award or settlement, 
lawyers can pay filing fees, conduct discovery, and retain experts.  If the 
claim is unsuccessful, the lawyer receives nothing.  This fee arrangement 
shifts the risk of litigation to lawyers.  In the United States, “[e]ssentially 
all . . . class actions are funded with contingent fees.”367  In addition, 
contingency fee arrangements encourage lawyers to screen potential claims 
carefully—it is in their interest to spend time and money only on matters that 
are likely to result in a significant recovery and thereby significant fees.368 
The recommendation also restricts contingency fee arrangements with 
non-attorneys.  In jurisdictions where contingency fees with lawyers are 
restricted, third-party litigation funders have been the lifeblood of private 
rights of action.  In Australia and the United Kingdom, in particular, 
specialized litigation financing firms have emerged in recent decades.369  
These firms agree to cover the costs of litigation in return for a percentage of 
any damage awards.370  This system is similar to contingent fee 
arrangements, except that a third-party firm performs the financing function 
in place of the plaintiffs’ attorney.  While the recommendation does not 
proscribe such fee arrangements, its restrictions on funders’ ability to 
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influence plaintiffs’ litigation strategy are likely to deter prospective 
litigation financiers.  This insistence on funder passivity may not preclude 
third-party financing, but it could limit funding to only the strongest legal 
claims.371  Funders, much like plaintiffs’ lawyers in the United States who 
finance cases, would likely want to have some control over decisions that 
could affect whether the suit they support succeeds in court and whether they 
recover their upfront costs. 
Portugal’s experience shows how the absence of a funding mechanism 
can render even a liberal opt-out system impotent.  Portugal is one of the few 
European nations that has an opt-out rule for group actions.372  Individuals 
and organizations certified by the government have the right to bring opt-out 
consumer and other collective claims, which Portuguese law calls a “popular 
action.”373  DECO, Portugal’s leading consumer organization, is most closely 
identified with popular actions.374  Since the opt-out rule was established in 
1995, however, DECO has brought only a few popular actions on behalf of 
Portuguese consumers.375  Although DECO appears interested in using the 
legal process more aggressively,376 the group is unable to do so due to the 
high costs of litigation.377  In the absence of a funding mechanism, the opt-
out popular actions are unlikely to be feasible on a large-scale. 
In addition, the recommendation endorses the loser-pay rules and thereby 
compounds the difficulties associated with litigation financing.378  Per this 
rule, the party that loses a case is required to cover the other party’s legal 
costs.  A plaintiff that is unsuccessful in a legal action will typically be 
ordered to pay the defendant’s legal expenses, which in some instances could 
amount to hundreds of thousands of euros.  The loser pays rule is intended to 
deter “frivolous” lawsuits, but it could go too far in the other direction.  Few 
lawsuits are guaranteed to produce victories so the threat of covering a 
defendant’s fees could discourage even meritorious claims.379  When parties 
have to fund their own legal actions and also face the risk of paying their 
adversary’s legal expenses, the “chilling effect” on private suits can be 
significant and perhaps fatal.380 
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c. The Restriction on Non-Compensatory Damages: A Secondary Flaw 
 
The EC’s recommendation has another provision that further diminishes 
the attractiveness of private lawsuits: it seeks to restrict damages to no 
greater than compensatory damages, signaling that the EC views treble and 
punitive damages with hostility. 
The recommendation’s strict requirement that claimants obtain only 
compensatory damages could hurt private enforcement.  Capping damages at 
a compensatory level decreases the expected benefits from litigation and 
diminishes the incentive for parties to file claims.  It also risks under-
deterrence of harmful behavior.  In many areas of law, in which illegal 
conduct is likely to go undetected at times, optimal deterrence requires more 
than just compensatory damages.381  It is telling that even the mandatory 
treble damages under federal U.S. antitrust law appear to be inadequate for 
deterrence.382   
To be sure, this ceiling on damages is not nearly as problematic as the 
EC’s insistence on opt-in actions and hostility to third-party financing 
mechanisms.  In many cases, compensatory damages can provide strong 
incentive to bring class actions.  And importantly for deterrence purposes, 
private damages actions should not be examined in a vacuum.  Public and 
private sanctions need to be viewed together because stronger public 
penalties can offset more limited private relief.383 
 
D. The Influence of the American “Tort Reform” Narrative and Business 
Victimhood Mythology on the European Commission Is Apparent—and 
Unfortunate 
 
Any neutral observer ought to wonder why the European Union was so 
timid in its recommendation.  Unfortunately, the European Union has a 
history of developing policy by shadow boxing with the United States and its 
allegedly out-of-control litigation culture384—a mentality that U.S. industry 
has cultivated and promoted.385  Examples abound of EU policymakers and 
official bodies accepting and propagating American industry’s business 
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victimhood mythology.  European Union regulators have cautioned about 
“U.S.-style excesses,”386 while Member State departments have warned of 
“exposing business to spurious or vexatious claims or unwittingly creat[ing] 
a compensation culture.”387  Even modest proposals are couched in a 
defensive posture.  For instance, the former EU competition commissioner 
reassured a skeptical audience that she had “left [her] cowboy hat at home” 
and that reforms would not bring about a U.S.-style system.388  As Hannah 
Buxbaum has written, “a specific antagonism toward the U.S. class action 
system—not merely a desire to craft an indigenous version of collective 
actions—has become a backdrop to European law reform.”389 
A review of the EC documents published before the directive confirms 
that the business victimhood narrative in the United States has influenced—
and ultimately hurt—the European private enforcement project.  Together 
with the 2013 recommendation, the EC published a communication to other 
EU bodies that lays out the rationale for its policy choices.390  The 
communication notes the need to prevent “abusive litigation”391 and states 
that defendants may feel pressure to settle cases “only in order to prevent or 
minimize possible damage.”392  Citing a resolution of the European 
Parliament, this document stresses the need to “fight[] abusive litigation”393 
through the exclusion of “punitive damages, third-party financing of 
collective redress, and contingency fees for lawyers.”394  It also states that 
opt-out procedures enhance the abusive potential of class actions.395  Private 
enforcement in the United States is described as “an illustration of the 
vulnerability of a system to abusive litigation.”396  Indicative of the deep 
influence of the United States industry narrative on European lawmakers, the 
communication credits recent Supreme Court decisions for restricting class 
actions “in view of the detrimental economic and legal effects of a system 
that is open to abuse by frivolous litigation.”397 
The EC’s 2008 white paper on Damages Actions for Antitrust Violations 
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sounds many of the same themes.398  This document proposed rules for 
creating an effective private enforcement mechanism, and the recent 
directive and recommendation, described above, incorporated many of the 
outlined proposals.  The white paper rejected a number of procedural options 
that an earlier green paper had put forth for consideration.399  For example, 
the white paper stated that compensation, not deterrence, should be the 
principal aim of damages actions.400  On this basis, EC rejected the 
possibility of double damages for injured parties and touted the superiority of 
opt-in actions over opt-out actions.401  
Along with the white paper, the EC published two documents that offer 
insights on its approach to private antitrust enforcement: a staff working 
paper and impact assessment report.402  These publications refer to the risk of 
“excesses” from a private enforcement system.403  They reflect a tension 
between providing for effective private rights of action and also protecting 
against litigation “abuse.”  For example, the working paper states that 
collective redress is important “for access to justice.”404  Yet, in the next 
clause, it observes that “excesses . . . have been reported from other 
jurisdictions.”405  In evaluating the particular procedural options in the green 
paper, the impact assessment report rejects the most aggressive set of rules—
for example, opt-out actions and double damages—for similar reasons.  It 
worries about the risk of “excesses” and the growth of a “litigation culture” 
in Europe.406  Moreover, the document states that a strong private 
enforcement regime could discourage pro-consumer conduct by dominant 
firms.407  
Remarkably, the Commission elevated the supposed American 
experience over homegrown practice.  In 2008, the Commission 
acknowledged that excesses had not been reported in the two European 
jurisdictions that then had opt-out systems: the Netherlands and Portugal.408  
Even as it distinguished U.S. legal culture and rules from its European 
counterparts, the working paper underscored the need to establish rules that 
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“serve as effective safeguards against misuse of the system.”409  It notes that 
in combination with other procedural rules, “opt-out actions have in other 
jurisdictions been perceived to lead to excesses,”410 including plaintiffs’ 
attorneys assuming control of a case and profiting at the expense of 
claimants.411  Notably, the Office of Fair Trading, while crediting these 
tropes in the American context, discounted the threat of a “U.S. style 
litigation culture” arising from opt-out actions in the United Kingdom.412 
The European Commission has embraced a narrative on the American 
tort system that is fundamentally false.  This story of excess is not based on 
empirical fact.413  Rather, it relies almost exclusively on distorted anecdotes 
and misrepresentations of recent history.414  In reality, the tort system has 
been an important means of compensating victims and deterring socially 
harmful behavior.  In a number of areas, Americans suffer from a deficit of 
private enforcement, not the publicized—and false—surfeit, because 
businesses still find it profitable to break the law.415 
The “exporting” of the U.S. tort reform story to the European Union is 
unfortunate for European consumers and small businesses.  With its reflexive 
acceptance of themes propagated by American opponents of private rights of 
action, the EC has stunted private enforcement mechanisms.  The European 
framework embodied in the recent directive and, in particular, the 
recommendation does not have the features necessary for small claims to be 
vindicated.  Fortunately, Member States still have the discretion to go beyond 
what the recommendation and directive require.  Some EU nations have 
already established superior aggregate litigation mechanisms, and others 
have expressed an interest in doing so.  But of course, other Member States 
will enact only the minimum procedures necessary to comply with EU 
dictates.  When he wrote his famous memo in 1971, Lewis Powell probably 
did not foresee his work shaping policy on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
V. TRANSATLANTIC COMPARISON OF ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTIONS: SOME 
CONVERGENT TENDENCIES BUT CRITICAL DIFFERENCES WILL PERSIST OR 
EMERGE 
 
From a distant view, private enforcement systems in the United States 
and European Union are on a trajectory of convergence.  For the United 
States, the once-strong private enforcement regime is weakening at a 
troubling pace.  While private enforcement in some areas remains resilient, 
courts are whittling away at the regime’s overall vigor.  In particular, 
expansive application of the Federal Arbitration Act and imposition of 
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heightened class certification standards have presented grave problems.416  
Meanwhile, the largely ineffectual private enforcement systems of EU 
Member States are gradually improving as they enact procedural 
requirements of the EU recommendation and directive into national law, 
which will bolster private enforcement in antitrust law.417  The main 
obstacles will be the absence of mechanisms for financing litigation and the 
presence of opt-in, rather than opt-out, group actions.  Yet, uniformity is 
unlikely to be the result because the EU recommendation establishes only 
general principles to be enacted into law at the national level.  Some 
European nations, including Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, and the 
United Kingdom, have already taken steps to meet the challenges.418  
In the medium term, the trajectories of the private enforcement systems 
in the United States and European Union also point to functional 
convergence.  The nature of the challenges that both are likely to face also 
suggests that the systems will come to share certain features and flaws.  Two 
likely developments warrant discussion.  First, private enforcement systems 
in both the United States and European Union will have difficulty 
accommodating the adjudication of low-value individual claims.  Second, the 
incentive structure in both systems will encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
attempt to amass and litigate claims of medium and high value in hopes of 
entering a global, opt-out settlement.  A company’s willingness to enter into 
a global, opt-out settlement will hinge on whether it faces sufficient exposure 
from individual lawsuits. 
 
A. Convergence in the Medium Term: A Struggle to Accommodate Low-
Value Claims 
 
The U.S.’s opt-out class action system was once designed for regulating 
bad practices that cause a small amount of loss at the individual level, but 
result in significant damages on an aggregate scale.419  The new rigors of 
class certification420 and proliferation of arbitration clauses,421 however, have 
undermined this function.  Similarly, in European countries, the lack of opt-
out class action systems422 and viable methods of litigation finance423 will 
mean that few, if any, attorneys will bear the risk of filing suit on low-value 
claims.  
In the United States, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have 
erected two major procedural barriers to class actions in recent years.  First, 
the Court’s expansive interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act has 
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empowered corporations to impose class action waivers on consumers.  In 
other words, businesses have virtual carte blanche to deprive consumers of 
their right to bring class actions in court and insist that they pursue individual 
arbitration to recover damages.  In practice, mandatory individual arbitration 
means few, if any, low-value legal claims will be pursued.424  Leaving aside 
the possibility of government action, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class 
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a 
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”425 
But even when they can escape mandatory bilateral arbitration, consumer 
class actions will confront significant difficulties in seeking certification.  
First, many federal courts are now requiring that plaintiffs, prior to 
certification, present a method to ascertain the identities of class members 
through objective criteria—a seemingly reasonable requirement but one that 
is very difficult to satisfy in many consumers goods contexts.426  This 
ascertainability requirement, particularly in its harsher iterations, eliminates 
the possibility of almost all class actions involving inexpensive goods 
because there is no method to individually identify the legions of consumers 
who do not retain documentation (such as receipts) of low-value purchases.  
Second, other class certification prerequisites imposed by the Supreme Court 
require plaintiffs to present more evidence in an early stage of litigation, 
which translates to higher costs and greater uncertainty.427  Plaintiffs have to 
engage in factual discovery and retain experts to certify a class today.  
Unduly high class certification standards can deter the filing of meritorious 
claims.428   
Despite these myriad vexing challenges, there will remain a thin band of 
low-value suits that the U.S. system will be able to accommodate, even if it is 
a struggle.  These cases will involve interactions between consumers and 
remote actors (such as product manufacturers) in which the parties are not in 
privity and, therefore, cannot be bound by arbitration clauses.  The cases will 
also involve purchases for which there is ready documentation.  A good 
example, which satisfies both conditions, is a consumer who files a class 
action suit concerning an automobile with a safety defect.  The consumer 
likely sustained substantial damages and is in contractual privity with the car 
dealership, not the manufacturer.  
Much like in the United States, consumer class actions will face serious 
obstacles in Europe.  Today, most European jurisdictions with collective 
redress procedures have opt-in class action mechanisms,429 which the EU 
recommendation reinforces.  Because opt-in rates are generally very low, 
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opt-in suits, whether brought by an individual or a qualified organization, are 
not attractive from an economic perspective.  And opt-in actions are only a 
part of the problem.  Even if opt-out mechanisms were enacted across the 
EU, the general unavailability of contingent fee and third-party financing 
arrangements, combined with a “loser pays” cost-shifting rule, would deter 
group actions.430  External funding is essential for undertaking group 
litigation, especially in cost-intensive areas such as antitrust.431 
 
B. Convergence in the Medium Term: Inefficient Manual Aggregation of 
Higher Value Claims to Strive for Global Settlements 
 
When a common practice or policy causes mass harm, it is optimal that 
mechanisms exist for mass accountability.  As set forth above, however, 
while both the United States and Europe will have class actions available on 
the books, they will have limited real-world impact.    
All hope for mass accountability will not be lost, however.  Both the 
United States and European Union have viable mechanisms to settle disputes 
on a class-wide, opt-out basis, even if they cannot reliably be litigated in this 
manner.  In the United States, a settlement complaint that provides for a 
national opt-out class action settlement can be prepared and judicially 
approved.  Although the traditional requirements for class certification apply 
to the certification of classes for settlement, it is widely understood that the 
requirements are far more lax than class certification for litigation 
purposes.432  Similarly, the Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass 
Damages (“WCAM”)433 enables an opt-out class settlement across the 
European Union, and even the world.434  Under the WCAM, plaintiffs can 
establish a special purpose foundation and enter into a settlement with a 
defendant, which is binding on all parties who do not opt out.435   
The challenge is that corporate defendants will not settle claims on an 
aggregate basis out of the goodness of their hearts.  Rather, they will need to 
face sufficient exposure from meritorious litigation that they must “resort to” 
the provision of en masse redress.  This option can be attractive to a 
wrongdoer confronted with the specter of death by a thousand separate 
lawsuits. A classwide settlement gives the defendant total peace and 
certainty: the corporation can pay a set amount to the universe of aggrieved 
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at one time and terminate future legal claims.436  In contrast, a defendant with 
the potential for large liability but with only a few small lawsuits on its hands 
is unlikely to settle claims globally.  
Accordingly, for the growing number of disputes that cannot be litigated 
as opt-out class actions, but that nevertheless involve shared factual and legal 
issues, plaintiffs’ attorneys in both the United States and Europe are likely to 
execute similar litigation strategies.  When possible, they will seek to amass 
and litigate individual, or smaller group, claims in the hopes of compelling a 
defendant to enter into a global opt-out settlement.  In other words, attorneys 
will build an inventory of clients with the same claims to litigate.   
This strategy likely will not be viable for low-value individual claims.  
First, those with small value claims will typically not care enough to litigate.  
Second, even assuming that an attorney could assemble a very large number 
of identical low-value (say, $20) claims, the overhead costs of managing the 
inventory would often exceed the expected value of successful litigation or 
arbitration.  The defendant would also be unlikely to ever face sufficient 
exposure to want to enter into a global settlement.437  For the plaintiffs, the 
costs are simply too great and the likelihood of success too low.   
The aggregation strategy could work when the individual claims are of 
greater value, though.  This is true even when the claims are subject to 
bilateral arbitration.  For example, in the United States in 2013, an opt-out 
class action settlement was reached between Pennsylvania landowners and a 
fracking company for claims arising from the alleged improper calculation of 
royalty payments by the fracking company.438  Each agreement between the 
fracking company and the purportedly thousand-plus landowners had a 
bilateral arbitration agreement.439  However, because there were fourteen 
named plaintiffs with high value claims, and because plaintiffs’ counsel 
appeared capable of assembling a far greater number, the fracking company 
felt sufficiently exposed to liability that it opted to enter into a multi-million 
dollar class action settlement, rather than risk its chances with an 
unforeseeable number of bilateral arbitrations.440  The plaintiffs’ lawyers 
successfully assembled enough individual claims to compel the defendant to 
settle on an aggregate basis.  
Some plaintiffs’ lawyers in the United States have deployed the same 
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strategy in the employment context as well.  After Concepcion, many 
employers required their employees to sign bilateral arbitration agreements, 
requiring the submission of employer-employee disputes to arbitration and 
prohibiting class actions.  When a dispute common to many employees has 
arisen under those circumstances, plaintiffs’ attorneys have had success 
signing up several individuals to prosecute separate arbitrations.441  In wage-
and-hour cases, for example, in which the value of individual claims can 
amount to tens of thousands of dollars, defendants confront serious risks (and 
costs in the form of arbitration and attorneys’ fees) if they were to fight these 
cases individually, rather than settle globally.    
The creative assembly of claims approach mirrors that employed in mass 
tort cases in the U.S.  In the 1990s, the Supreme Court effectively closed the 
door on class actions with a strong personal injury component.442  For 
example, class actions concerning exposure to asbestos or use of an unsafe 
prescription drug can no longer be certified.443  Despite the inability to 
proceed on a class-wide basis, the underlying facts in cases of this kind are 
often common to large groups of people, each of whom may have suffered 
debilitating losses.  Consequently, attorneys litigating these cases assemble 
large inventories, usually with the assistance of a cottage industry of lead 
generation and referral firms.  The law does not allow the settlement of these 
claims on an opt-out basis, but the parties often reach a mass settlement for 
the group of victims who have filed suit.444 
In Europe, litigation barriers will compel plaintiffs’ lawyers to deploy a 
similar strategy as in the United States.  The absence of an opt-in class action 
mechanism and the lack of viable litigation finance will prevent the effective 
adjudication of low-value claims in Europe.  
It will likely be a different story with medium and high value claims, 
though.  For example, imagine that there is a popular refrigerator throughout 
Europe, which costs $1,500.  The refrigerators have a design defect, 
rendering them unusable after a few months of use.  Assume that all EU 
Member States incorporate opt-in class actions for consumer cases in the 
near future, as encouraged by the EC’s 2013 recommendation on collective 
redress.  Because the individual claims are of high value and the product is 
popular, an enterprising plaintiffs’ attorney would probably seek to sign up 
plaintiffs and seed collective cases throughout the European Union.  Once 
the collective cases are off the ground and notice is disseminated to potential 
owners of the refrigerators, the high value ($1,500) of the individual damages 
would mean that a non-trivial number of individuals would likely opt in.  The 
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goal of the plaintiffs’ attorney would be to litigate the collective cases 
successfully in different European countries until the defendant refrigerator 
manufacturer sought complete peace by settling the case on an opt-out basis 
throughout Europe, using WCAM in the Netherlands, for its fair value.445 
In the coming years, in both the United States and Europe, there will 
likely be a category of cases in which global, opt-out class resolution will be 
possible.  The scope of these cases will likely be narrow, however, as the 
claims will have to be comparatively high in value to attract sufficient 
individual participation, which will be rare.  If a sufficient number of claims 
are not aggregated, a defendant would not face adequate legal risk to enter 
into such a settlement.  This litigation process is also inefficient.  The elegant 
efficiency of the class action lies in its ability to resolve a large number of 
common claims in one stroke.  The manual aggregation model described here 
is a far cry from that.  Plaintiffs’ firms, who in the United States already 
routinely experience cash-flow challenges, will have to dedicate significant 
resources to procedural planning, which will be diverted from other 
enforcement efforts. 
 
C. Divergence of Private Enforcement Regimes in the Long Term: An 
Ascendant EU? 
 
Private enforcement in the United States is likely to remain fettered over 
a longer time horizon.  The Supreme Court has played the lead role in 
weakening private enforcement.  It has erected a series of procedural 
obstacles against parties that seek to vindicate their rights.446  Unless the 
Court’s composition moves significantly to the left in the coming years, it is 
hard to imagine how or why it would overturn its anti-private enforcement 
decisions over the past few decades.   
The vacancy on the Court created by the death of Justice Antonin Scalia 
during a Democratic presidency has fueled speculation that dramatic change 
could be on the horizon.  There are reasons to be circumspect, however.  
While over the past thirty years the conservative majority on the Court has 
been consistent and assertive in its opposition to private enforcement, the 
liberal minority has been inconsistent and modest in its support of private 
enforcement.  For example, Justice David Souter, who was considered to be 
among the liberal bloc despite his appointment by a Republican president, 
authored the majority opinion in the Twombly decision that ushered in the era 
of heightened pleading requirements.447  And although Justice Kagan is 
considered among the more vocal and eloquent advocates of private 
enforcement on the Court, even she did not question the thirty-plus years of 
arbitration precedent in her dissent in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant against the majority’s evisceration of the effective vindication 
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doctrine.448   
President Obama’s nomination of Court of Appeals Judge Merrick 
Garland does not suggest that meaningful change is afoot, either.  Judge 
Garland signed on to an opinion with a particularly harsh reading of recent 
class certification precedent that would require plaintiffs—at the class 
certification stage—to prove that all putative class members were likely 
injured by the defendant’s conduct.449  Fortunately, this interpretation has 
been almost uniformly rejected by other judges at the district and appellate 
levels.450  Unfortunately, if Judge Garland is confirmed, his endorsement of 
stringent class certification standards does not inspire confidence that future 
Supreme Court decisions will reinvigorate the American private enforcement 
system.  At best, some of the most far-reaching decisions concerning 
arbitration may be modestly pared back, while other elements—heightened 
pleading standards, termination of disputes at summary judgment and 
onerous evidentiary burdens at class certification—will become entrenched.   
The shift in Court composition does bring some good news.  Barring a 
Republican victory in the 2016 presidential election that results in a 
conservative successor to Justice Scalia, it is now unlikely that the system 
will continue to wither through, for example, Supreme Court adoption of a 
strict ascertainability requirement for class actions451 or adoption of a 
requirement for standing that a plaintiff plead an injury beyond violation of a 
statute,452 which many previously feared to be around the corner.   
While Congress can override the Supreme Court, the prospects of 
positive legislative action are slim.  Republicans, who in 2016 control both 
houses of Congress, have been consistently hostile to private rights of action 
in all areas of law.453  And even when the Democrats controlled Congress 
and the White House in 2009 and 2010, they did little to reverse the pro-
defendant decisions of the Supreme Court.454  For example, despite high 
hopes for undoing the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the Federal 
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Arbitration Act,455 the Democratic Congress did not act. 
In contrast to the bleak outlook in the United States, select European 
states could implement more robust private enforcement procedures.  The 
implementation of the EC recommendation and EU directive is very likely to 
produce disappointing results.  This framework fails to provide the incentives 
necessary for strong private enforcement by consumers and other diffuse 
groups.456  Even with the directive and recommendation, however, EU 
Member States still retain significant discretion over procedure, meaning the 
current diversity of systems is likely to persist and even grow.  Some 
Member States already provide for opt-out class actions or settlements and 
third-party funding of litigation.  Given the scope for experimentation within 
the European Union, other Member States may also go beyond the baseline 
requirements of EU policy and establish opt-out class actions, third-party 
funding procedures, and perhaps even punitive damages.  
Based on current practice and debated procedural reforms, Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom appear most likely to 
implement strong private enforcement systems.  Portuguese law already 
provides for opt-out class actions for all plaintiffs, although so far only 
“qualified” consumer organizations have taken advantage of this 
procedure.457  Denmark allows the government-appointed consumer 
ombudsman to bring opt-out actions on behalf of consumers when each 
individual claim has a value of less than DKK 2,000—about $300 in 2016.458  
And the Netherlands has an opt-out settlement process.459  
The United Kingdom has recognized the need for more effective private 
rights of action and taken concrete steps to advance this objective.  In March 
2015, the UK Parliament enacted the Consumer Rights Act that allows 
qualified organizations or injured parties to bring opt-out class actions for 
violations of antitrust law.460  Importantly, the United Kingdom already has a 
third-party litigation system that, though still in its infancy,461 could become 
an important means of financing collective litigation.462  Taking a cue from 
the United States rather than the European Union, one UK administrative 
body has even eschewed a compensation-only approach to monetary 
remedies.  In 2012, the Competition Appeal Tribunal awarded exemplary 
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damages to a firm victimized by predatory conduct, which brought a follow-
on antitrust action.463  
The prospect of expanding private rights of action in Europe is real.  The 
countries previously listed already have in place some of the elements of a 
strong system of private enforcement.  Provided they implement strong opt-
out and funding mechanisms, they can facilitate a greater number of private 
actions.  In this event, these nations will have private enforcement regimes 
that are stronger than those of EU Member States that enact only the 
minimum requirements of the directive and recommendations, and possibly 
also stronger than the private enforcement system in the United States. 
 
VI. DIVERGENCE IN OVERALL ENFORCEMENT PATTERNS: A CASE STUDY ON 
ANTITRUST IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 
 
To understand the overall effectiveness of a legal regime, private and 
public enforcement have to be analyzed together.  Public and private 
enforcement are both complements and substitutes for each other.464  Given 
that much of the enhancement of private enforcement in the European Union 
has arisen in the context of antitrust, it is an area ripe for comparative 
examination.  Overall antitrust enforcement will look quite different in the 
United States and Europe.  Private antitrust actions that follow government 
enforcement exemplify complementary aspects; whereas stand-alone actions 
illustrate how private enforcement can fill in for public actions.  Where 
public enforcement is weak, private enforcement will need to play a more 
central role.465  But if public enforcement is more vigorous, private 
enforcement will not be quite as essential. 
Multiple indicia suggest that public antitrust enforcement is weaker in 
the United States vis-à-vis Europe.  The antitrust agencies in the United 
States enjoy greater public discretion and have been reluctant to pursue non-
cartel cases.  In contrast, in Europe, the European Commission and twenty-
eight national competition authorities generally face judicial checks on their 
discretion and aggressively challenge both cartel and non-cartel activity.466  
In light of these important differences in public enforcement, the private 
enforcement deficit will be felt more acutely in the United States than in 
Europe. 
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A. Private Antitrust Enforcement Will Be Functionally Similar in the 
United States and Europe 
 
In the near term, private enforcement will have large gaps in both the 
United States and Europe.  Although the doctrinal barriers to effective 
private enforcement are very different in the United States and European 
Union, the private enforcement landscapes bear many similarities.  Consumer 
class actions face serious obstacles in both jurisdictions—due to the FAA and 
rigorous class certification requirements in the United States and the opt-in 
mechanism and restrictions on litigation financing in Europe.  In practice, 
consumers, small businesses, and other large, dispersed groups will have to 
overcome high hurdles in enforcing their legal rights under the antitrust laws, 
whereas medium-sized and large corporations will face fewer difficulties. 
One Transatlantic difference in consumer suits is worth noting.  Indirect 
purchasers are ordinarily not in contractual privity with defendants.  As a 
result in U.S. states that permit indirect purchaser lawsuits, mandatory 
arbitration clauses cannot bar these actions.467  At the same time, they do face 
significant challenges at the class certification stage, including in showing 
the ascertainability of class members.  Nonetheless, some commentators are 
cautiously optimistic about the future of indirect purchaser class actions in 
the United States.468  In Europe, in contrast, the opt-in requirement, which 
makes it very difficult to aggregate low value claims, likely dooms most 
indirect purchaser suits. 
In the United States, medium-sized and large businesses will face an 
easier time protecting their legal rights than consumers will.  Unlike 
consumers and small businesses, who must ordinarily accept standard-form 
contracts with arbitration provisions, larger businesses, in their capacity as 
customers, can negotiate contracts with suppliers and insist on the exclusion 
of mandatory arbitration clauses.469  And when businesses sue rivals in their 
competitor capacity, contractual impediments such as arbitration do not arise.  
Also, because their individual stakes in a case can be large, corporate 
plaintiffs do not necessarily need to aggregate their claims with others 
through the class action mechanism.  As a result, the FAA and the higher 
class certification standards do not restrict antitrust suits by business to the 
same degree that they restrict consumer actions.  
Despite these procedural advantages, businesses will continue to face 
obstacles in standalone antitrust litigation in the United States.  The more 
permissive standards for granting defendants’ motions-to-dismiss and 
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motions for summary judgment will hamper business plaintiffs.  In general, 
standalone cases, whether alleging collusion or exclusion, will be difficult to 
prosecute because courts insist on detailed factual allegations before much 
discovery has been taken.470  On the other hand, businesses are more likely to 
succeed in follow-on suits brought after government enforcement action 
produces a favorable decision or settlement. 
In Europe, business plaintiffs may face fewer obstacles than their 
American counterparts.  Given the wide diversity of national laws, it is not 
possible to generalize judicial attitudes toward business plaintiffs across EU 
Member States.  In the United Kingdom, businesses have brought successful 
follow-on suits in the Competition Appeal Tribunal,471 which could be a 
harbinger of more follow-on suits by injured competitors and other 
businesses.472  The prospects of success of standalone suits, though less clear, 
also seem promising.  Encouragingly, some national courts, unlike courts in 
the United States, have been reluctant to grant summary judgment or 
otherwise terminate cases early in favor of defendants.473  
 
B. Public Enforcement Is Not Likely to Compensate for the Private 
Enforcement Deficit in the United States 
 
At present, the U.S. antitrust agencies have great discretion over the 
matters they bring—and do not bring.  When the Department of Justice and 
the Federal Trade Commission decide to close an investigation without 
taking action, they face few, if any, transparency conditions.  They are not 
required to publish a statement or analysis and, in fact, are not even obligated 
to disclose when they have closed an investigation.474  To their credit, the 
agencies have occasionally issued closing statements when they opted not to 
litigate high-profile matters.475  But the statements generally are brief and 
often not especially informative to the public.476 
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While private parties can file complaints and lobby the DOJ or FTC to 
bring enforcement actions, the agencies are under no duty to respond and a 
failure to act on a complaint is not subject to judicial review.477  In addition, 
the nebulous legal standards of modern antitrust law confer broad discretion 
on the antitrust agencies and allow for greater subjectivity in enforcement.478 
When the antitrust agencies settle cases rather than proceed to trial, their 
freedom of action is constrained to some extent.  Under the Tunney Act, the 
DOJ must publish the complaint, a competitive analysis, and the terms of the 
settlement.479  The public then has a sixty-day window in which to submit 
comments responding to the proposed settlement.480  At the end of this 
period, the DOJ must respond to the public comments and submit the 
settlement to a judge for approval.481  The FTC follows a similar notice and 
comment process for its settlements but does not have to obtain judicial 
consent.482 
Although the Tunney Act was intended to strengthen public 
accountability,483 the law in practice has merely added a procedural formality 
to the settlement system.484  Appeals courts have directed district judges to 
apply a highly deferential standard of review.485  They are prohibited from 
looking beyond the DOJ complaint and inquiring into related but undisclosed 
allegations of competitive harms.486  Courts review the settlement for 
whether its terms address the competitive harms alleged in the government’s 
complaint.487  Because the DOJ typically files the complaint and settlement 
in court simultaneously, it can craft the complaint to fit with the settlement’s 
provisions.488  Even in cases in which the DOJ has settled a case after it filed 
a complaint in court (and in a fashion that appeared not to mitigate the 
alleged harms to competition), judges have refused to second-guess the 
DOJ’s judgment and reject the settlement.489  In practice, the Tunney Act 
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process has generally operated as a judicial “rubber stamp.”490 
With their broad prosecutorial discretion, the agencies have chosen to 
emphasize cartel enforcement.  An overwhelming fraction of case filings in 
recent years have been against businesses and individuals accused of 
collusive behavior.491  When challenging hard-core cartel activity such as 
price-fixing and bid rigging, the Department of Justice pursues criminal 
sanctions against corporations and individuals.492  These sanctions include 
large fines for businesses and prison sentences for implicated individuals.493  
These anti-cartel penalties are arguably more punitive than those sought by 
other antitrust authorities.  In particular, the United States is the only nation 
that has consistently sentenced individual cartelists to terms in prison.494  
In sharp contrast to its vigorous anti-cartel program, the DOJ filed only 
one monopolization complaint and settled three such cases between 2005 and 
2014.495  While the FTC’s enforcement focus has been somewhat more 
balanced,496 its record is still modest.  The agency has brought fewer than ten 
conduct cases, which encompass actions challenging either collusive or 
monopolistic conduct, in each year since 2007.497  
Outside of price-fixing and bid rigging cases, the agencies have also been 
significantly more restrained in the remedies that they pursue.498  When 
prosecuting other forms of collusive behavior, the agencies have typically 
sought injunctions that order the defendants to “go forth and sin no more.”499  
Aside from a few rare exceptions,500 the agencies have not pursued 
disgorgement as a remedy.  In fact, from 2003 to 2012, the FTC followed 
self-imposed limits on when it would seek monetary remedies in antitrust 
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cases.501  Although the Sherman Act’s anti-monopolization section provides 
for criminal enforcement, the U.S. government has not obtained a criminal 
indictment in a pure monopolization case since the early 1970s.502   
In monopolization matters, structural remedies have also fallen out of 
favor.  In the government’s last major monopolization case, Microsoft, the 
DOJ settled the case in exchange for an assortment of conduct remedies.503  
The days of ambitious government monopolization suits that resulted in the 
restructuring of non-competitive markets appear to have ended with the 
breakup of AT&T in 1982.504 
The characteristics of public antitrust enforcement in the United States 
underscore the need for vigorous private enforcement.  The DOJ and FTC 
enjoy broad prosecutorial discretion and have been unwilling to use their full 
legal arsenal outside of the cartel context.  Because public enforcement is 
subject to regulatory capture and alone cannot provide adequate deterrence, 
private rights of action are essential.  And while private treble damages 
actions provide vital deterrence against cartels, their role is even more 
essential in areas such as monopolization and vertical restraints, which have 
been largely neglected by government enforcers.  
Given these realities, the decades-long attack on private enforcement by 
the courts has seriously compromised the effectiveness of the American 
antitrust enterprise.  Public enforcement, as it presently operates, is not 
capable of compensating for the private enforcement deficit.  To be sure, the 
agencies could opt to be more aggressive in the coming years.  They could, 
for instance, seek criminal penalties against monopolists that illegally 
maintain their power.505  And state antitrust enforcers, who face tight 
resource constraints,506 could enlist outside counsel and bring more parens 
patriae actions on behalf of residents harmed by anticompetitive behavior.507  
But until the antitrust authorities decide, and are provided the means, to 
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increase their enforcement efforts, the U.S. antitrust system will have serious 
gaps. 
 
C. In Europe, Strong Public Enforcement Will Substantially Compensate 
for Weak Private Rights of Action 
 
In contrast to its American counterparts, the European Commission 
enjoys much less prosecutorial discretion.  European Union law imposes 
broad transparency duties on EU institutions.508  For example, in the merger 
area, the EC “systematically lists all notified transactions, disclosing the lines 
of business in which participating firms are active, and reports [its] 
dispositions of each of the notified transactions.”509  In select high-profile 
merger clearances, the EC has published detailed analyses explaining its 
decision.510 
The EC also has an obligation to provide a written notification to 
complaints from private parties.511  If it declines to act on a complaint, the 
EC has to provide a factual and legal basis for its decision.512  And this non-
action decision is subject to judicial review,513 which, though deferential,514 
still has substantive teeth.  The European General Court has, in fact, vacated 
decisions of the EC to close investigations because the Commission failed to 
investigate sufficiently and respond adequately to a complainant.515  Of 
course, the complaint system is not perfect: concentrated and organized 
interests, such as competitors, are more likely to file complaints than diffuse 
groups such as consumers.516 
While national enforcers in France and Germany are considered more 
aggressive and effective than those in other Member States,517 the national 
competition authorities generally also face real constraints on their freedom 
of action.  National procedural rules are required to conform to the “principle 
of effectiveness” in enforcing EU antitrust law.518  The European 
Competition Network, a group comprising all EU competition authorities, 
has both formal and informal means of policing underperforming agencies.519  
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In addition, many Member States constrain the discretion of their 
competition agencies.  The French national competition authority has very 
little discretion.  It has to take action—positive or negative—on every 
complaint it receives.520  On the other end of the spectrum, the German 
competition agency has unfettered discretion.521  The norm across the twenty-
eight Member States appears to be close to the constraints imposed on the 
EC.522  As an example, in the United Kingdom, the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal has overturned OFT decisions to close investigations without taking 
action.523 
The EC and national competition authorities also face judicial scrutiny of 
their settlements.  EC settlements are subject to “market testing” whereby 
interested third parties can submit comments responding to the terms of 
settlement.524  While this process is akin to the Tunney Act’s notice and 
comment requirements, the procedure in Europe appears more responsive 
than the U.S. procedure.  As an example, consider the drawn-out 
investigation of Google in Europe: the EC abandoned three settlement 
proposals in response to criticism from injured competitors and the public 
and ultimately charged the company in April 2015 with abuse of dominance 
in internet search.525  In addition to market testing, settlements are also 
subject to judicial review.526  The standard of review appears deferential, 
although it has not been fully clarified.527  At the Member State level, 
settlements are also subject to review.  For example, the UK’s Competition 
Appellate Tribunal can reject OFT settlements on procedural and substantive 
grounds.528 
European competition enforcers have targeted all forms of 
anticompetitive behavior.  While the EC has emphasized uncovering and 
punishing cartels, it has also been aggressive in challenging abuses of 
dominance (the European equivalent of monopolization), including predatory 
pricing, price squeezing, and refusals-to-deal.529  The national competition 
authorities have attacked a comparably broad, perhaps even broader, range of 
anticompetitive conduct.  For example, national competition authorities in 
2014 brought cases against cartels, predatory pricing, resale price 
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maintenance, and tying.530  
Just as they challenge many types of anticompetitive behavior, European 
competition authorities seek aggressive remedies for all types of antitrust 
violations.  The European Commission has the power to impose fines of up 
to ten percent of a company’s worldwide revenue.531  It today levies large, 
albeit still inadequate,532 fines against cartels.  The EC imposed fines of more 
than €8.7 billion on just cartels between 2010 and 2014.533  These cartel 
penalties are larger than what the United States levied on corporate antitrust 
defendants during that four-year period.534  To be sure, the larger fines in the 
European Union may reflect an important remedial difference: unlike in the 
United States, criminal cartel enforcement against businesses and individuals 
has yet to take root in Europe.535 
Leaving aside the question of whether Europe or the United States is 
more aggressive against cartels, the European authorities pursue more 
aggressive remedies against antitrust violations in general.  While their 
fining power has frequently been directed at cartels, European competition 
authorities have fined companies for a variety of non-cartel conduct.  For 
instance, in 2009, the European Commission imposed a €1.06 billion fine 
against Intel for monopolizing the market for personal computer chipsets.536  
And the EC has fined Microsoft nearly €2 billion for monopolizing the 
personal computer operating system market and for failing to comply with its 
legal commitments.537 
National competition authorities have also levied large fines on 
companies for cartel and non-cartel conduct.  The French competition 
authority in late 2014 fined thirteen consumer goods companies, including 
Colgate-Palmolive and Procter & Gamble, nearly €1 billion collectively for 
fixing the price of products such as deodorant, dishwashing soap, and 
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toothpaste.538  In the UK, the Office of Fair Trading (absorbed by the 
Competition and Markets Authority in April 2014539) over the past decade 
fined companies for price-fixing540 and resale price maintenance.541  In the 
soccer jersey case, which gave rise to the unsatisfactory private action by 
Which?, the OFT fined the parties involved a total of nearly ₤15 million.542 
The EC and national competition authorities will continue to play the 
lead role in enforcing antitrust law in the EU.  These entities operate in a 
legal environment that stresses the primacy of public law enforcers,543 and 
carry the burden of antitrust enforcement.544  Competition authorities in 
Europe are subject to strong legal constraints that enhance public 
accountability.  Importantly, they have used their remedial powers across the 
board—targeting collusion, monopolization, and other forms of 
anticompetitive behavior. 
Due to these features of public antitrust enforcement, the private 
enforcement deficit will not be as damaging in Europe as it is in the United 
States.  Undoubtedly, EU Member States should go beyond the minimum 
requirements of the directive and establish opt-out class actions and effective 
litigation funding.  Private enforcement has an important complementary 
role, and its absence is likely to produce suboptimal enforcement.545  This is 
particularly true for newer members of the European Union with less 
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developed public enforcement systems.546  Nevertheless, given the stronger 
public enforcement institutions in Europe as a whole, the overall enforcement 
shortfall from weak private rights of action is not likely to be as great as it is 




For as long as most can remember, the view across the Atlantic has been 
markedly different when it comes to regulatory architecture.  In the United 
States, a comparatively weak public enforcement structure was buttressed by 
a sturdy private enforcement regime through which members of the public 
could directly regulate harmful conduct through litigation.  By contrast, in 
Europe, the structure was dominated by a strong state regulatory system with 
private enforcement having only a negligible presence.  
As time passes, the view across the Atlantic with respect to private 
enforcement is beginning to look quite similar.  In the United States, private 
industry has waged a powerful, decades-long campaign against the civil 
justice system.  This message has been particularly effective in undermining 
private enforcement.  Beginning in the 1970s, industry cultivated and 
propagated a business victimhood mythology, depicting corporations as 
victims of a litigation explosion and casting plaintiffs (and their attorneys) as 
mercenaries out to make easy money.  This mythology has played a powerful 
role in reshaping the attitudes of the public, legislators, and judges.  As a 
result, the federal courts have erected procedural barriers that subvert the 
efficacy of private enforcement.   
While private enforcement has been receding in the United States, it has 
started to move to the fore in Europe.  The developments have largely 
emerged as the European Union and its Member States have sought to bolster 
the enforcement of their antitrust laws.  Progress thus far, however, has 
assumed a one step forward, half step back pace.  By “importing” the anti-
private enforcement messaging and narrative of business victimhood from 
the United States, European Union lawmakers have declined to take the steps 
necessary to establish strong private rights of action.  Further progress in 
Europe requires rejecting this empirically unsupported narrative of “litigation 
excess” in the United States.  Promisingly, some EU Member States have 
enacted some of the procedural elements of a strong private enforcement 
system and may be poised to go further. 
Private enforcement has to be understood in a larger context—in relation 
to its public counterpart.  Despite the trend toward convergence of private 
enforcement between the United States and Europe, the overall enforcement 
picture is markedly different.  Looking at one area of law, antitrust, a 
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divergence in overall enforcement will emerge between the United States and 
European Union.  Given the broad discretion and restricted focus of public 
enforcers in the United States, the hobbled private enforcement system will 
severely compromise overall antitrust enforcement.  For Europe, public 
enforcement remains strong and dedicated to rooting out both 
anticompetitive cartel and non-cartel behavior.  So while Europe’s private 
enforcement system is presently anemic for the most part, overall 
enforcement will remain relatively robust.  Notwithstanding weak private 
rights of action on both sides of the Atlantic, Europe’s public-oriented 
antitrust enforcement regime will possess greater vitality than its American 
counterpart. 
